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PARTICIPATION BY THE STATES IN
THE ENFORCEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY*

A

LL. over the country during the last few years, and
with increasing frequency after the Supreme Court

indicated in 1950 that not all union conduct is protected
by the right of free speech,' labor-union attorneys have
been attempting to establish immunity in the state courts
for unlawful union action on the basis of the argument
that the Federal Government has pre-empted the "field"
of labor relations regulation. We contend here that this
argument, also advanced in the learned journals,2 has no
foundation in law; that, if it succeeds, effective enforce* Reprinted by permission from the Fifth Annual Conference on Labor,
copyright by New York University, published by Matthew Bender & Co.,
Albany 1, New York. [Editor's note.]
I Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684,
93 L.Ed. 834 (1949); Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460,
70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773, 94 L.Ed. 995 (1950); Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784,
94 L.Ed. 1045 (1950).
2 Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319,
334 et seq. (1951); Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64
HARV. L. Rzv. 211 (1950); Feldblum, Some Aspects of Minority Union
Picketing in New York, 20 FoRD. L. REv. 176, 193 et seq. (1951). Cf. Smith.
The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 46 Mimsi:
L. REv. 593 (1948).
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ment of the existing national labor policy will be impeded;
and that a general ouster of state jurisdiction at this time
would inhibit far more than it would stimulate the development of a viable, comprehensive labor policy for the
country. Put positively, we contend that while uniformity
in labor policy and law throughout the nation is desirable,
dominant considerations favor the participation of the
states, to a limited extent, in the enforcement and development of national labor policy. We shall see that the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions and certain internal
necessities of administration foreclose all state action which
either presently or potentially conflicts with national action,
and even some state action which is consistent with national action. But we shall also see that neither the Constitution, existing labor relations legislation, applicable
Supreme Court decisions, nor practical considerations call
for a complete ouster of state action. We shall contend
that the best hope for an enduring labor policy lies in
deliberate encouragement of state participation in its development.

I.
The Doctrine of Pre-Emption by Occupation
of the Field and Its Implications
An ancient sage once said that there are more ways
than one to skin a cat.
The currently approved version of labor-law history in
this country informs us that trade unions were engaged
until roughly the year 1930 in. an uneven struggle with
a basely unfair legal system, a system in which "property" rights were exalted over "human" rights, in which
employers had gross advantages over struggling labor
unions. Then in the 'thirties, this version of history continues, the law became more nearly just: Anti-injunction
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legislation 3 kept the courts from using the law to the undue
advantage of employers and nonunion employees; labor
relations legislation 4 went as far as law can, short of absolute compulsion, in building up labor unions. In the early
'forties the trend toward justice accelerated: The Sherman
Act was erased as a check on union action, 5 and, in case
there might be a few weapons left in the arsenal of the
anti-union forces, the Constitution of the United States was
inserted as a bar to their use.6 But later in the 'forties, in
1947 to be exact, the forces of reaction, momentarily in
power, imposed on an unconscious but still unwilling nation a piece of legislation, the Taft-Hartley Act, 7 which
was designed to enslave the workingman and to erode the
manifestly just legislative program of the 'thirties. In the
late 'forties and the early 'fifties came the unkindest cut
8
of all - the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of
the scope of constitutional protection argumentatively afforded labor-union action by the decisions of the early
'forties. For the forces of justice, then, the prospects
seemed dim, as of the year 1950. In that year it seemed
sound to assert that the law had reverted to its earlier
posture of unfairness, or, to put the matter another way,
that the law was intent upon interfering with the freedom
of action of unions in about the same way that it has interfered with the freedom of action of businessmen and all
other persons engaged in the pursuit of their own interests.
s E.g., the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932),

29 U.S.C. §§101-

115 (1946).
4 E.g., the Wagner Act, officially the National Labor Relations Act, 49
STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1946).
5 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed.

788 (1941).

6 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093

(1940).

7 Officially the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 STAT. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
8 See note 1 supra.
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This would never do, for somehow it was felt that unions
required special immunities. The great need was for some
device which would restore the status quo ante 1947-1950.
The legislatures, state and national, seemed strangely
churlish, the public completely unaware of the social dangers inherent in regulation of union conduct. Heightening
the desperation of the situation, the Constitution seemed to
become sterile. Obviously, with all relatively straightforward sources of immunity unavailable, a daring, imaginative approach was necessary. How masterly it would be if
the tool of oppression could be transformed into the instrument of liberation!
A. The Doctrine Stated:
The pre-emptionists argue that the Taft-Hartley Act
is a complete code of labor relations law, comprehensively
governing the labor relations problems subject to federal
power, and that, therefore, the legislatures, courts and
other agencies of the several states are, with some minor
exceptions, without power to act in regard to the labor
relations problems of interstate employers. The pre-emptionists argue, again with exceptions presently to be noted,
that state law may not be applied in interstate labor situations whether the state law be consistent or inconsistent
with the national law, or even if it establishes a rule for a
situation left ungoverned by the national law. Their general contention is that a state law consistent with national
law is unnecessary, that a state law in conflict with national law must obviously bow, and that a state law which
goes beyond, but is not in conflict with national law, may
not be applied - all because Congress in enacting such a
comprehensive scheme of regulation as the Taft-Hartley
Act must implicitly have rejected as unsound or undesir-
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able all measures not expressly set forth in the Act.9
The pre-emption doctrine may be restated in syllogistic
form:
Major (legal) Premise: Where the Congress has regulated
a field of human activity in detail, the states have no
power to regulate that field (except in its strictly intrastate phases), even in a consistent, a complementary,
or a supplementary way.
Minor (factual) Premise: Congress has in the Taft-Hartley
Act thoroughly regulated the field of interstate labor
relations.
Conclusion: The states may not regulate interstate labor
relations, as such, except to the extent specifically permitted by the Taft-Hartley Act.
B. Implications of the Doctrine as Stated:
This doctrine, so impressive as stated, would have even
more impressive consequences if accepted by the Supreme
Court of the United States and by the state courts and
legislatures. It would mean, generally speaking, that labor
relations problems- representation issues, employer and
union conduct in labor disputes - are to be settled in the
federal system or not at all. It would mean that issues in
the greater part of American labor relations are for the
National Labor Relations Board -or completely nonjusticiable. It would mean that if a certain form of union
or employer conduct were illegal under state law, but
neither privileged nor unlawful under federal law, no adjudicating agency, state or federal, would have jurisdiction
to forbid the conduct, clearly unlawful though it might be.
9 This is believed to be a fair statement of the position taken by Mr.
Mozart Ratner, NLRB Assistant General Counsel, in the N.Y.U. Fifth Annual
Conference on Labor. It is the view to be gathered from the large number
of cases in which labor-union attorneys have resisted state-court action. And
it is the view expressed in the articles cited in note 2 supra.
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For those who are inclined to be concerned only with basic
realities, perhaps the most serious and impressive consequence of the pre-emption doctrine is that it would in
very many important instances provide immunity for
vicious employer and union conduct which is expressly and
directly made unlawful by both state and federal law. For
this result to accrue it would be necessary only foi the National Labor Relations Board, in the exercise of its virtually
unreviewable discretion,' ° to decline jurisdiction in a case
involving a plain violation of law. The NLRB having declined jurisdiction, the pre-emption doctrine would foreclose state action, even where such action Was based on
state law, common or statutory, consistent with federal law.
On such a thread would pre-emptionists suspend legal
rights and duties, in a nation which prides itself upon its
rule of law.
Thus, to take one of the most important current laborlaw issues, the pre-emptionists argue that a state court may
not enjoin minority picketing for recognition where no other
union has been certified." The view of the NLRB today
is that such picketing is not violative of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 2 although it amounts to precisely the same kind of
economic coercion of employee choice which is forbidden
to employers under a section of the NLRA 13 virtually identical to the section 14 prohibiting union restraint or coercion
of employees.' 5 But even with possible Taft-Hartley sanc-

2o

Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLR.B, 187 F.(2d) 418 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815, 72 S.Ct. 29, 96 L.Ed. *28 (1951).
But see
Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.(2d) 833 (7th Cir. 1952), where
the court held that the NLRB had abused its discretion in deciding not to
assume jurisdiction over a plainly unlawful boycott.
Cf. Comment, 50
MrNH. L. REv. 899 (1952).
11 Cox and Seidman, supra note 2, at 225-6.
12 Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
is Section 8 (a) (1), outlawing employer interference with or restraint
or coercion of employees in the exercise of the right to join or not to join
labor unions.
14 Section 8 (b) (1)
(A), outlawing union restraint or coercion of
employees in the exercise of the right to join or not to join labor unions.

STATES' PARTICIPATION IN NAT'L LABOR POLICY

7

tions against such coercive union conduct erased, complete
immunity is not yet available; for some state courts, unembarrassed by the expertise of -the National Labor Relations Board, have readily seen that such picketing flies in
the face of the national policy in favor of an uncoerced
choice on the part of employees. In the vanguard in this
field, the New York Court of Appeals has gone so far as to
assert that such picketing, being plainly in pursuit of an
unlawful objective, ought to be enjoined. 1 6 Ten years ago,
that conclusion might not have been possible; the Thornhill doctrine 17 might have been regarded as an insuperable
bar to an injunction. Today, however, we know that picketing in pursuit of an unlawful objective may constitutionally be enjoined by the state courts."' Hence, if unions
are -to maintain their now-traditional immunity to legal
process, some substitute must be found. The pre-emption
doctrine has been pressed into service.
The pre-emptionists themselves insist, it must be repeated, that the Taft-Hartley Act does not outlaw minority
picketing for recognition, except where another union has
been certified. 19 Yet no pre-emptionist has as yet contended that minority picketing for recognition is in accordance with the national labor policy, which is oriented
largely in terms of free employee choice. The situation
then is this: While such picketing appears to be neither
unlawful nor privileged under federal law, it is rather
clearly in conflict with the national labor policy.2 0 In these
circumstances it would seem sensible to conclude that, in
15

Cf. Petro, Recognition of Picketing Under the NLRA, 2

LAB. L.J.

803 (1951).

16 Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.(2d) 697
(1951) discussed in Petro, State Jurisdiction to Control Recognition Picketing, 2 LAB. L.J. 883 (1951).
17 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093

(1940).

18 See note 1 supra.
19 Cf. Feldblum, supra note 2.
20 Cf. Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339

U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045 (1950); Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn,
303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.(2nd) 697 (1951).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

the absence of a clear Congressional declaration to the
effect that such conduct is privileged, there should be no
question as to the power of the states to act. The fact is,
however, that the pre-emptionists challenge the existence
of this power. They say, to paraphrase one, that around
the periphery of each kind of union conduct declared an
unfair practice by federal law, there is an area which the
states are no longer free to enter, and that, therefore, since
federal law prohibits minority picketing for recognition
where another union has been certified, state law may not
prohibit any minority picketing.2 1 We may conclude, then,
that according to the pre-emptionists, specific details of
conduct which are neither outlawed nor specifically privileged by federal law are not within the state's power to
regulate, if the general type of conduct has been regulated
by federal law.
The pre-emptionists similarly contend that the states
may not regulate conduct which has been specifically regulated by federal law, even though the state regulation be
essentially similar or virtually identical to federal regulation. As an example, consider the situation where a union
compels an employer to discriminate against nonunion
workers. The common law in certain states declares that
such coercion of discrimination is an actionable tort unless
it occurs in circumstances providing legal justification. 2
In some states, this justification is held lacking if the union
is a "closed" one, i.e., a union which arbitrarily restricts
membership. 23 The same union conduct is an unfair practice under the Taft-Hartley Act, under which legislation a
union may compel discrimination in employment only if it
is a party to a lawful union-shop agreement, and then only
Cox and Seidman, supra note 2, at 223.
Cf. Clark v. Curtis, 297 N.Y. 1014, 80 N.E.(2d) 536 (1948); Wilson
v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.(2d) 461 (Sup.Ct. 1950).
23 Cf. Dotson v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
34 Cal.(2d) 362, 210 P.(2d) 5 (1949); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.
(2d) 721, 155 P.(2d) 329 (1944).
21

22
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in regard to workers who have refused to pay standard
dues and initiation fees. 24 Notwithstanding the virtual
identity of federal and state law in this area, and the more
effective prosecution of national labor policy which participation by state courts would tend to insure, the pre-emptionists insist upon a complete ouster of state jurisdiction.
They urge, as a general rule, that resort must not be had
to the state courts under state law even though the ultimate
result of state action would be essentially the same as action
under the federal law. 5
In summary, then, the pre-emptionists contend for an
ouster of state jurisdiction both where state law is essentially similar -to federal law, and where state law, while
consistent with federal policy, goes beyond it to regulate
details of certain conduct when such details are currently
held to be unregulated by federal law. The effect of the
pre-emption doctrine, viewed starkly, is to leave the enforcement of the national labor policy completely in the
hands of the National Labor Relations Board. This point
cannot be over-emphasized. The pre-emption doctrine, as
argued in labor relations today, is really not concerned
with substantive law, or with the enforcement of national
labor policy, or even with the abiding problems inherent
in securing a due accommodation between the nation and
the states. Indeed, all these considerations, which ought
to be paramount, are rejected. The fact is that an attempt
is being made to secure for the National Labor Relations
Board exclusive authority in the labor relations field. Owing
to the manifest limitations on NLRB activity, the result of
a decision fav6ring the pre-emptionists will mean, not enforcement of the congressionally declared national labor
policy, but enforcement of National Labor Relations Board
24 Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2)
of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
25 For qualified acceptance of this argument by the New York Court
of Appeals, see Costaro v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.(2d) 454 (1951).
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policy. Today supremacy of National Labor Relations
Board policy may mean virtual immunity for unlawful
union conduct in many instances. Tomorrow it may mean
similar immunity for equally unlawful employer conduct.
Viewed broadly, then, -the pre-emption issue goes far beyond the momentary advantage of union or employer. The
vital point is far more important. A victory for the preemption doctrine in labor relations means the subordination
of law, of justice and of effective legal procedure to ad-

ministrative discretion.26 As usual, the founding fathers
knew what they were about when they insisted that the
judicial power be vested in judges who possessed permanent tenure and irreducible salaries.2 7 The pre-emptionists, by and large, are the same persons who favor the proliferation of administrative agencies to exercise judicial
26 When the President proposed to abolish the office of the independent
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, in the Spring of
1950, one of the principal arguments made in support of the proposal was
that the division of authority between the Board and the General Counsel
created much confusion. However, the General Counsel said before a Senate
Committee which was considering the President's proposal that the confusion
emanated, not from the divided authority, but from the NLRB's own unpredictable and inconsistent decisions on assumption of jurisdiction. After
a careful study of NLRB decisions, said the General Counsel, he found "no
one policy but many policies utterly inconsistent with one another." "Some
of these policies," he asserted, "extend the Board's jurisdiction far beyond
the area covered by the Board under the Wagner Act. Others restrict the
area covered under that Act. What is policy one month may not be policy
the next month. Policies are inconsistent between different industries and
within the same industry." The General Counsel cited a large number of
NLRB decisions which, he said, demonstrated the force of his statement. See
the statement by Robert N. Denham, General Consel of the NLRB in
Hearings before Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on President's Reorganization Plan No. 12, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950). Similiar conclusions have been stated and documented by the Chairman of the New York State Labor Relations Board, Keith Lorenz. See his
address at N.Y.U. Fifth Annual Conference on Labor. See also Lorenz,
Conflict of Jurisdiction between National and New York State Labor Relations Boards, 5 INDUST. & LAB. REL. REv. 411 (1952).
For a brief account
of the basic features of the dispute between the NLRB and its General
Counsel see the discussion in Administrative Discretion v. Rule of Law,
1 LAB. L.J. 579 (1950), and the excellent note in 50 MicH. L. REv. 899
(1952), which also documents the charge that the NLRB, not its original
(independent) General Counsel, is responsible for existing confusion concerning the coverage of the Act. For an example of the use made by the
NLRB of its now virtually unreviewable discretion to refuse to take jurisdiction over unfair practices affecting commerce, see Joliet Contractors Ass'n
v. NLRB, 193 F.(2d) 833 (7th Cir. 1952).
27 U.S.
CONST. Art. III, § 1.
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powers even though the personnel of those agencies do not
possess the characteristics of office clearly set forth in the
Constitution for judicial officers. It is perhaps a logical
step, once having encouraged the growth of such agencies,
28
to completely subordinate law to their discretion.
II.

The Fallaciesof the Pre-Emption Doctrine as Stated
A. The Major Premise and Houston v. Moore.29
The Honorable Bushrod Washington, Associate Justice
on John Marshall's Court, commanded far less sentiment,
it would seem, than did his magnificent uncle. Of the
seven Justices who made up the Court when Houston v.
Moore was decided, with Justice Washington writing the
majority opinion, two dissented and the concurring justices
dissociated themselves from Washington's reasoning.30 In
these circumstances, only the holding in Houston v. Moore
would seem to be important as a guide to the command of
the Constitution in matters of federal-state relations; the
fact that all the Justices rejected Washington's reasoning
suggests that the language of his opinion may be accepted
or rejected more readily. Not so for the pre-emptionists of
today, however, who argue the reverse. They wish to forget the holding of Houston v. Moore - for it is squarely
against them -and to inflate the importance of Justice
Washington's lonely reasoning.
The pre-emption doctrine is put forth by its current proponents as a substitute for the concurrent-jurisdiction doc28 For a scholarly survey of the literature dealing with the underlying
problem, see Schwartz, Executive Power and the Disappearance of Law, 21
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 487 (1946).
29 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L.Ed. 19 (U.S. 1820).
s0 Mr. Justice Washington's opinion concludes as follows: "Two of the
judges are of opinion that the law in question is unconstitutional, and that
the judgment below ought to be reversed.
"The other judges are of opinion that the judgment ought to be affirmed;
but they do not concur in all respects in the reasons which influence my
opinion." 5 L.Ed. at 26.
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trine - the doctrine that state law may not be applied in
interstate situations only where the state law is essentially
inconsistent with national law. As we shall see later in this
discussion, no issue is taken with the pre-emption doctrine
where it is rooted in and organically unfolds from the basic
constitutional principle of federal supremacy in the field of
commerce among the several states. 3 1 On the contrary, we
positively urge an ouster of state law which conflicts with
federal law. But the pre-emptionists insist that conflict is
not the determinative consideration; they wish to oust state
action even where it enforces the national labor policy.
The issue, therefore, is whether or not the current preemptionists are correct in positing as their basic premise
that where Congress has regulated a field in some detail
state law must bow without regard to whether it be consistent, supplementary, or conflicting.
Justice Washington's opinion in Houston v. Moore is
perhaps the most frequently quoted authority for this
proposition. But only certain parts of the opinion are
quoted, while others, which we shall presently note, are
not mentioned. The pre-emptionists are fond of quoting

the following language :32
31 "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2. No one has ever seriously suggested that a theory
of general pre-emption can be pieced out of this provision. In fact, careful
reading of the provision and some acquaintance with the facts in 1787 should
convince most people that the framers accepted freely the possibility that
national law would be enforced to a considerable extent in state courts. There
was indeed doubt as to whether there would be a complete federal judicial
system for many years after 1787, and in this connection it should be noted
that nothing in the Constitution commanded the Congress to set up a federal
judiciary at a level below the Supreme Court. Thus the framers, unlike the
doctrinaire pre-emptionists of today, and in line with their usual good sense,
gladly accepted the possibility of participation by the states in the enforcement of national policy. They drew the line, in the Supremacy Clause, as
we do here, at the point where state law would conflict with federal law.
They envisioned the Supreme Court as the agency which would ensure
consistency between state and federal action, again as we do in the present
paper.
32 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L.Ed. 19, 24 (U.S. 1820).

STATES' PARTICIPATION IN NAT'L LABOR POLICY 13
To subject them [the people] to the operation of two laws
upon the subject, dictated by distinct wills, particularly in
a case inflicting pains and penalties, is, to my apprehension,
something very much like oppression, if not worse. In
short, I am altogether incapable of comprehending how
two distinct wills can, at the same time, be exercised in
relation to the same subject, to be effectual, and at the
same time compatible with each other. If they correspond
in every respect, then the latter is idle and inoperative; if
they differ, they must, in the nature of things, oppose each
other, so far as they do differ. If the one imposes a certain punishment for a certain offense, the presumption is,
that this was deemed sufficient, and, under all circumstances
the only proper one. If the other legislature imposes a different punishment, in kind or degree, I am at a loss to conceive how they can both consist harmoniously together.
I consider [it] a novel and unconstitutional doctrine,
that in cases where the state governments have a concurrent
power of legislation with the national government, they may
legislate upon any subject on which Congress has acted,
provided the two laws are not in terms, or in their operation, contradictory and repugnant to each other.

Notwithstanding the Honorable Bushrod Washington,
however, the doctrine which the foregoing language terms
"novel and unconstitutional" was probably accepted by the
Justices sitting with Washington. To use his own words,
they agreed "that the judgment ought to be affirmed; but
they do not concur in all respects in the reasons which influence my opinion." 33 But, more startling than that, an
analysis of the facts of Houston v. Moore, the holding and
the whole of Justice Washington's opinion will indicate
that Washington himself, when all was said and done, accepted as sound what he was pleased at one point in the
opinion to call a "novel and unconstitutional" doctrine.
And what was the actual judgment in the case? The
issue in Houston v. Moore was whether or not the State of
Id., 5 L.Ed. at 26,
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Pennsylvania's provision for court-martial of any militiaman who disobeyed the federal draft law then in effect
could constitutionally be applied in view of the fact that it
duplicated and went slightly beyond (but was not inconsistent with) similar provisions of the existing federal law.
In view of the language which we have just quoted from
Justice Washington's opinion, one would naturally expect
to learn 'that the Supreme Court invalidated the Pennsylvania court-martial procedure. Nothing could be further
from the truth. In fact, -the United States Supreme Court,
over the dissent of two justices who accepted arguments
which the current pre-emptionists have revived, upheld
the Pennsylvania law.
This contrast between the holding of Houston v. Moore
and rthe parts of Washington's opinion already quoted may
explain why Washington's colleagues of the majority did
not concur "in all respects" with his reasoning. However,
they could concur with such of Washington's reasoning as
did not contradict the actual holding, and there is some
reasoning of that kind. Thus, in answer to the objection
that upholding 'the Pennsylvania law "would either oust
the jurisdiction of the United States court-martial or might
34
subject the accused to be twice tried for the same offense"
35
Justice Washington replied:
. . . if the jurisdiction of the two courts be concurrent,
the sentence of either court, either of conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded, in bar of the prosecution before the
other, as much so as the judgment of a state court, in a
civil case of concurrent jurisdiction, may be pleaded in bar
of an action for the same cause, instituted in a circuit
court of the United States.

Again, when it was argued that upholding the Pennsylvania law might allow the Governor of that state to pardon
violators and thus conceivably defeat the federal policy,
Ibid.
35 Ibid.
34
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Justice Washington first reserved his doubts as to the validity of such a pardon, and then, significantly, went on to
say that if the governor could pardon, "this would only furnish a reason why Congress should vest the jurisdiction in
these cases exclusively in a court-martial acting under the
36
authority of the United States."1
The truth is, as further excerpts from Washington's
opinion demonstrate conclusively, that Hquston v. Moore
stands, not for automatic pre-emption whenever Congress
has regulated a subject in detail, but for pre-emption only
where Congress has expressly and conclusively provided
for an ouster of concurrent state jurisdiction or where the
state law is actually or potentially in conflict with federal
law. With this formulation of the pre-emption doctrine, no
issue is taken here. 37 It is the current pre-emptionists in
the labor field who as a matter of fact reject the holding of
Houston v. Moore and the position taken by Justice. Washington in the concluding paragraph of his opinion:3
Upon the whole, I am of opinion, after the most laborious examination of. this delicate question, that the state
court-martial had a concurrent jurisdiction with the tribunal
pointed out by the acts of Congress to try a militia-man
who had disobeyed the call of the President, and to enforce
the laws of Congress against such delinquent; and that this
authority will remain to be so exercised until it shall please
Congress to vest it exclusively elsewhere, or until the state
of Pennsylvania shall withdraw from their court-martial the
authority to take such jurisdiction. At all events, this is not
one of those clear cases of repugnance to the constitution
of the United States where I should feel myself at liberty
to declare the law to be unconstitutional; the sentence of
the court coram non judice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania erroneous on these grounds.

As currently argued in the labor relations field, then, the
36 Ibid.
37
38

See note 31 supra.
5 Wheat. 1, 5 L.Ed. 19, 26 (U.S. 1820).
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pre-emption doctrine is far from persuasive, at least to the
extent that it rests upon such cases as Houston v. Moore.
The basic flaw in the whole doctrine lies in a slippery misstatement of the first premise. So far as -the Constitution
of the United States is concerned, state law is expressly
invalidated only where it is in conflict with federal law;
and it is implicitly invalidated only where it places the
kinds of burdens upon interstate commerce with which the
framers of the Constitution were so whole-heartedly preoccupied. The pre-emptionists may validly rely upon
neither the Constitution nor Houston v. Moore for the
proposition that the mere detailed regulation of a given
field automatically, and without more, ousts consistent
state regulation. Houston v. Moore very clearly, and a 'host
of other Supreme Court decisions argumentatively, are
precedents to the contrary. As Justice Black has recently
put it, the Supreme Court:39
. . . has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier
constitutional principle that states have power to legislate
against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their
laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional
prohibition, or of some valid federal law.

B. The Minor Premise and the Fragmentary Character
of the Taft-Hartley Act:
Even were we to accept the major premise of the preemptionists, 'their conclusion would not follow, for the middle premise is factually inaccurate. The Taft-Hartley Act
is not and was never meant to be an exhaustive regulation
of all phases of the labor relations field. Furthermore, and
this is a matter of the most profound significance, the
39 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 536, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212 (1949). For an exhaustive review of the precedents, see Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547-61, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782 (1945).
We
shall discuss this matter and the applicable precedents much more fully in
Part III, infra.
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"field" of labor relations is so inherently indefinable, since
labor law merges with and overlaps so many other "fields,"
that the concept of general pre-emption shows itself to be
an extremely troublesome over-simplification when any
conscientious effort is made to apply it. As a result the
pre-emptionists either fall into unpredictable error, as
Messrs. Cox and Seidman did in suggesting that state laws
forbidding strikes and providing for compulsory arbitration
of public-utility labor disputes would not be invalidated by
the Supreme Court,40 or they find it necessary, as we shall
see, to resort to numerous ad hoc exceptions in order to
cover situations where federal pre-emption is simply unthinkable.
Labor relations problems, the substance of the laborlaw "field," reach out into most fields of law and human
conduct known to man. Almost all of the relationships between man and man which have been brought into courts
of law are present in labor relations, from simple assault
and battery to complicated contractual arrangements, from
the suppression of free comment and accepted political and
social rights to agreements in restraint of trade. When a
union man's right to testify against a legislative proposal is
countered by an expulsion from his union, which is in favor
of the proposal, 4 ' we may, if we wish, view the case from
'the point of view of civil rights. But if the union expels a
man because he is against the union's collective-bargaining
policy, how should we view the case? Is this a labor relations problem? Does it belong ,to the labor-law "field"? If
so, how is it that the "exhaustive" national regulation of
labor relations problems, which is what the pre-emptionists
The Supreme Court has
40 Cox and Seidman, supra note 2, at 240-41.
recently held that the states may not outlaw peacefully conducted strikes for
higher wages in any industry or firm subject to federal law. Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street etc. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364 (1951), hereinafter referred to
as the Wisconsin or the Wisconsin Public Utilities case.
41 Cf. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 113 AUt. 70

(1921).
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call the Taft-Hartley Act, does not directly or indirectly
deal with the problem? If the Taft-Hartley Act pre-empts
the labor relations field, should not the pre-emptionists
insist that no state may outlaw expulsions arising from disagreements on collective-bargaining policies or other "intemal" union matters? 42 And this, even though there
is nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act even remotely bearing
on the problem?
The pre-emptionists rejoin here with one of their ad
hoc exceptions. They interpose that the Act has explicitly
made itself inapplicable to the "field" of internal union
affairs. In support of their position they sometimes advance the proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A), which states
that "this paragraphshall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein." [Emphasis added.] 4 3 But the italicized words provide the key to
the inadequacy of this pre-emptionist makeshift. The
draftsmen of the Act knew full well that other paragraphs
of the Act would to some extent "impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules." Thus, everyone concerned with the law relating to. internal union affairs knows that three general solutions have been advanced
in regard to the troublesome problems of admission and
expulsion of union members - the basic "internal union

42 Here and there a court gets enthusiastic over the pre-emption doctrine
and proceeds to an entirely unsound result. Cf. Born v. Cease, 101 F. Supp.
473 (D. Alaska 1951), where the court dismissed a suit by a union member
for reinstatement to union membership based on charges of wrongful expulsion. Dismissal was predicated on the plainly erroneous assumption that
the matter was "covered" by the Taft-Hartley Act and that, therefore, only
the NLRB had jurisdiction. But nothing in the Act makes any expulsion

unlawful, and nothing in

the Act provides the remedy of reinstatement to

union membership. Cf. also NLRB v. Capital Service, Inc., 6 CCH LAB.
LAW REP. (4th ed.)
67,010 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
43 This was the position taken by NLRB Assistant General Counsel Ratner
at the N.Y.U. Fifth Annual Conference on Labor. But see Smith, supra

note 2, at 623-24.
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affairs" problem.44 Some have argued that the common
law is doing tolerably well in controlling abuses of union
power over their members; others have suggested that an
administrative agency be given the job; still others have
argued that the most socially desirable, the simplest and
the most effective device is simply to reduce union power
over employees by outlawing the closed shop, thus minimizing the necessity of thorough, detailed regulation of
union membership practices. The Taft-Hartley Act of
course adopts the latter course.45 Only those too unsophisticated to realize that high taxes, credit controls and conservative fiscal policies are more effective inflation deterrents than price and wage-fixing will fail to see that the
approach of the Taft-Hartley Act is a more thoroughgoing
regulation of internal union affairs and even membership
policies than the other direct regulations which have been
proposed. But if this is not enough to point up the fragility
of the pre-emptionist makeshift, we need only refer to the
Taft-Hartley requirement that all union officers file nonCommunist affidavits as a prerequisite to use of the National Labor Relations Act 4 6 and to the outlawing of excessive and discriminatory union initiation fees.4 7 It is

impossible to see how anyone can seriously argue, in view
of these provisions, that the Taft-Hartley Act consciously
and explicitly avoided all regulation of internal, union
affairs. Yet the pre-emptionists do make that argument.
For they must. Otherwise, in order to be coherent and
consistent, they must assert that all the admission and expulsion and other internal union-affairs cases being heard
44 For discussion of the various proposals, see Note, The Power of Trade
Union to Discipline Their Members, 96 U. of PA. L. Rav. 537 (1948). See
generally De Maio, Expulsion, Unions and the Courts in N.Y.U. FOURTH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 377 (1951); Summers, Disciplinary Powers

of Unions, 3 INDUST. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950), and Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 INDUST. & LAB. REL. REV. 15 (1950).
4' Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the NLRA as amended.
Cf.
Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 537 (1948).
46 Sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) of the NLRA, as amended.
47 Section 8 (b)

(5).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

by the state and federal common-law courts are nonjusticiable.4 8 And this is of course plainly unthinkable. The truth
is that the framers of the Taft-Hartley Act, while conscious
of having entered into the regulation of internal union affairs, entered in only a fragmentary way, with no intention
of ousting the pre-existing jurisdiction of the common-law
courts. And what is true here is true, with one or two exceptions, in the whole area of what is known ambiguously
as "labor law."
Perhaps no kinds of human conduct and related legal
doctrine are more similar to labor relations conduct and
doctrine than those falling within the "field" which is generally called "trade regulation." In fact, trade regulation
and labor law merge into each other factually, analytically
and doctrinally.4 9 In the Clayton" ° and Norris-LaGuardia 5 '
Acts, the Congress tried to legislate the similarities out of
existence; and the Supreme Court, which can do many
things that Congress cannot, actually succeeded, in the
48 For some idea of the number of cases involved, see the present writer's
articles in the 1949-1950 Survey of New York Law, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044,
1053-64 (1950); and the 1950 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 393401 (1951).
-9 A random selection of teaching materials on "labor law" will almost
always turn up either a chapter or a substantial section devoted to laws
regulating trade. See, e.g., GREGORY, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
COMMENTS Ch. X (1948); HANDLER AND HAYS, CASES ON LABOR LAW
700-717 (1950); LANDIS AND MANOFF, CASES ON LABOR LAW Ch. VII
(2d ed. 1942); SMITH, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 572-612
(1950).
The converse holds in teaching materials on "trade regulations."
See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION Ch.
X (1952).
Before the distinctions of the 1930's were drawn, it seemed to
be generally understood that labor relations, at least in the group sense, were
a part of the human conduct covered by laws regulating trade. See the
excellent collection of materials in HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADE REGULATION

Ch. I (2d ed. 1951), and see People v. Fisher, 14 Wend.

10 (N.Y. 1835).
50 Section 6 of the Clayton Act hopefully declared that "the labor of
a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce," disregarding the
real distinction between human beings themselves and their labor. The
latter is continually bought and sold, like every article of commerce, especially
since unions have undertaken to bargain collectively for numerous men, thus
heightening the impersonal elements of the labor transaction. 38 STAT. 731
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1946).
51 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1946).
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Hutcheson case,5 2 where Congress had failed.5 3 The Court
held that labor unions, acting alone, cannot be guilty of
restraints of trade.54 But now, without expressly overruling
the Supreme Court, the Congress has made directly unlawful a considerable number of the types of union conduct
which had previously been held unlawful as restraints of
trade.55 Whether a secondary strike is unlawful as an unfair practice, on the one hand, or as a restraint of trade,
on the other, makes no difference in the real world. And
this is especially true when the underlying sentiment for
declaring the conduct unlawful is in both instances the
same. Whether secondary strikes be held unlawful restraints of trade or unfair labor practices, the ultimate
source of the legal sanction is the healthy social antagonism
toward the "ganging-up" which both business cartels and
56
labor-union combinations manifest.
So, in any analysis which goes beyond the plainly superficial, the inherent identity of laws regulating trade and at
least some aspects of labor law must be recognized. The
"field" of labor law and the "field" of trade regulation
have many pastures in common. If the pre-emptionists
are to be consistent and coherent, therefore, they are
under an obligation to argue that no state may outlaw the
kinds of labor action which are declared to be unfair labor
practices under Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
52 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed.
788 (1941), holding that labor unions cannot violate the federal antitrust
laws, no matter what action they take, except when they combine with busi-

ness organizations.
53 Cf. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.

443, 41 S.Ct.
172, 65 L.Ed. 349 (1921), holding that Congress had not in the ClaytonAct, supra note 50, immunized labor unions against prosecution under the
Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
54 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed.

788 (1941).
55 Section 8 (b) (4) of the NLRA, as amended. For a case showing
how labor action presently outlawed by § 8 (b) (4) used to be prohibited
by the Sherman Act, see note 53 supra.
56 This sentiment is never made explicit in statutes or decisions expressly
outlawing secondary action by unions, but there would seem to be no other
explanation for such statutes or decisions.
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even though the state outlawry may be contained in a
statute generally forbidding restraints of trade by either
businessmen or unions.5 7 Here again, however, because of
the immanent weakness of the pre-emption doctrinebecause it is almost unthinkable, especially in view of a
number of Supreme Court decisions upholding state-court
injunctions against union restraints of trade, 58 to declare
that such state laws are precluded by the Taft-Hartley Act
the pre-emptionists are driven to another makeshift exception. They manufacture, without any basis in reason or
authority, the proposition that Congress has pre-empted
only the labor-law "field," not the "field" of trade regulation; and therefore, they conclude, the states may continue
to outlaw secondary labor action under their general
statutes in restraint of trade, because those statutes are not
"labor" laws. 59 Surely this is a plain tour de force. And
the strained artificiality of the fabrication appears even
more forcefully from a collateral line of analysis. As is
well known, the Federal Government has a comprehensive
body of trade regulations, embodied in the Sherman Act, 0
62
the Clayton Act,61 the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and a host of less well-known statutes63 - all more or less
administered by the Federal Trade Commission. If the
Taft-Hartley Act pre-empts the labor-law "field," why has
no one ever argued that the common-law or statutory juris57 Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct.
684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949), where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality, over free-speech objections, of the application of a general antitrust
statute to secondary picketing by a labor union.
58 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684,
93 L.Ed. 834 (1949); Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143 (1942).
59 This inference is drawn from the Ratner paper read at the N.Y.U.
Fifth Annual Conference on Labor and from the Cox and Seidman article,
supra note 2, at 240, 242, although the position is stated vaguely in both
cases.

See further note 68 infra.

60 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
61 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1946).
62 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1946).
63 For a list of federal antitrust laws, laws regulating trade and exceptions to such laws, see OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST
LAWS 61-69 (1948).
Note that the list was eight pages long in 1948.
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diction of state courts over unfair trade practices has been
pre-empted by the federal trade-regulation program? And
where does all this leave the pre-emptionist argument that
states may regulate under antitrust laws precisely the same
kind of conduct which may not be touched by labor laws?
Once again the only satisfactory conclusion is that the
pre-emption doctrine - as argued by the current preemptionists - is a confused and artificial set of ad hoc
propositions. 64 Once again it becomes clear that both the
major and the minor premises of the current pre-emption
argument are unsound, legally and factually, and that they
can lead only to greater confusion. The basic trouble is
that the pre-emption doctrine, as argued today, rests on an
arbitrary and untenable definition of the labor-law "field,"
necessitated by the clearly fragmentary character of existing national labor legislation.
The foregoing kind of analysis of the current pre-emption doctrine could be continued almost indefinitely. Is
not labor arbitration a part of the labor-law "field"? If so,
does the complete omission of any regulation of the arbitration process in the Taft-Hartley Act mean that the
whole thriving industry of labor arbitration is somehow
suspect? Or does the fragmentary attention to "featherbedding" in Section 8(b) (6) of the Taft-Hartley Act
mean that such common-law developments as the decisions
of the New York courts in Opera on Tour 6 5 and the recent
64

Thus Cox and Seidman, who

straightforwardly recognize ^that pre-

emption in labor relations cannot rest on Congressional intent, supra note
2, at 224, 226, et seq., insist that as a matter of policy practically all state
action should be precluded, ibid. Then they urge, nevertheless, that national
law may be regarded as not privileging "a limited number of [union] objectives so contrary to accepted standards as to warrant administrative condemnation." Id. at 239. In short, it would seem that these writers would
have the scope of labor immunity vary with their own feelings, or the feelings
of the NLRB, as to permissible union conduct. One may question the good
sense, if not the political maturity, of proposals such as this, which would
rank the responsibilities and powers' of the states so low, especially where
it is virtually admitted that the present legal structure does not establish
that ranking.
65 Opera on Tour, Inc., v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.(2d)
349
(1941).
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Dalzel166 case must cease? On the basis of the prima-facie
tort theory a whole structure of common law for concerted
labor action has been built. Is this structure to be torn
down or arrested in its present stage simply because the
Taft-Hartley Act has spoken - and consistently with the
common law, at that - on some phases? Or will the preemptionists make an exception here, as they have done in
the "fields" of internal union affairs and antitrust laws,
because, after all, tort law represents as identifiable a
"field" as antitrust law. Finally, why is it that the preemptionists never object to state-court injunctions against
picket-line violence when the Taft-Hartley Act regulates
that form of traditional union conduct as thoroughly and
pervasively as it regulates anything? 67 Do the pre-emptionists seriously maintain either that picket-line violence
does not fall naturally within the labor-relations "field" or
that, if it does, there is some inherent distinction between
laws against violence and laws forbidding other kinds of
68
anti-social conduct?
66 Dalzell Towing Co. v. United Marine Division, I.L.A., 279 App. Div.
212, 108 N.Y.S.(2d) 912 (1st Dep't 1951) (injunction issued against a
strike to prevent the employer from changing to three-shift operation). See
also 6 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (4th ed.)
66,891 (1951).
67 Cf. Erwin Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O.,
234 N.C. 321, 67 S.E.(2d) 372 (1951), where, over objections by the union
counsel on pre-emption grounds, the state court upheld an injunction against
violent picketing. The significance of this case in the light of the current
pre-emptionist movement is discussed in Petro, State jurisdiction to Regulate
Violent Picketing, 3 LAB. L.J. 3 (1952).
68 Cox and Seidman, supra note 2, at 236, contend that, notwithstanding
the Taft-Hartley ban on violent picketing, state laws prohibiting the same
action should continue to have application in interstate cases: "Congressional
regulation as part of a labor program," they suggest, "can scarcely be taken
to show that Congress meant to render the states powerless to deal with
offences against public order which are forbidden under laws of general
application." Of course it is impossible on any sensible basis to disagree with
this suggestion. The only trouble is that it applies equally to all state laws,
except, perhaps, the thoroughgoing, broad, labor relations type of state law
administered by an agency like the National Labor Relations Board. Labor
action is prohibited under the prima-facie tort theory, for example, not as
a part of a special scheme of labor relations laws, but simply because it is
felt to be tortious under "laws of general application," to use the phrase
just quoted from Cox and Seidman. So too with many other state laws, for
example state antitrust laws, which are applied to labor-union conduct. Thus
the approval of state laws prohibiting picket-line violence appears once more
as a concession by the pre-emptionists which shows the basic deficiencies of
the whole position.
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C. Summary and Restatement of the Problem:
It goes pretty much without saying that where the major
and minor premises of an argument are both unsound, the
ultimate proposition advanced can be sound only accidentally. The current pre-emption doctrine begins with
the premise that the mere existence of detailed federal
regulation of an area of human conduct, without more,
necessarily precludes all state regulation in that area, regardless of the consistency or inconsistency of the state
regulation with the federal regulation. We have seen that
the case principally relied upon for that premise, Houston
v. Moore,69 actually stands for the precise contrary. The
second -the

minor, or factual-

premise of the pre-

emption argument is that the Taft-Hartley Act amounts
to a comprehensive, detailed, even exhaustive code of
regulations for the "field" of labor relations. The fallacies
in this assumption are both numerous and slippery, but the
fundamental fallacy lies in the inconsistent, artificial delimitation of the "field" of labor law or labor relations. No
matter how that "field" is defined-whether to include
or to exclude violence, combinations in restraint of trade,
arbitration and internal union affairs, or whether the definition be in terms of fields of legal doctrine, such as trade
regulation, tort law, the law of unincorporated associations, etc. - the contention that the Taft-Hartley Act represents an exhaustive code of regulations, or was meant to
be such a code, simply does not hang together. The fact
that the pre-emptionists have themselves found it necessary to resort to a number of exceptions to their general
position in regard to the comprehensiveness and exhaustiveness of the Taft-Hartley Act strongly suggests that the
general position is extremely dubious.
Like most legal arguments, however, there is a trace of
solidity and strength in the pre-emption doctrine. The
69 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L.Ed. 19 (U.S. 1820).
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doctrine becomes essentially valid when it is developed on
the basis of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 70
More than that, it becomes a vital principle around which
a number of extremely important policy considerations and
practical factors naturally cluster. Thus, when the principle of federal supremacy is emphasized, and when it is
accepted that state action in conflict with federal law must
accordingly bow, attention is focused on the most fruitful
point, in terms of effective enforcement of national labor
policy. Energy is directed then, not to the empty, provoking project of frustrating state action for the mere sake of
frustration, but to the more creative job of making a place
for the participation of state instrumentalities in the effective enforcement of a uniform national labor policy. One
need not then say to the states that they must become
inert, for no good reason at all, and despite the genuine
sentiment which may lie behind the state action. And it
is then not necessary to bludgeon in a heavy-handed and
undiscriminating way the diverse approaches which may
have grown to deal with the abiding problems inherent in
concerted action by labor organizations. As a practical
matter, too, it is relatively easy to convince state authorities that action by them which is inconsistent with clear
national policy can be tolerated on grounds of neither ex.pediency nor justice; but it is most difficult to convince
conscientious state authorities that they must stand aside,
offering no relief to the victims of unlawful conduct, especially when the enforced aloofness is the product of nothing
more than a naked insistence on the exclusive and paramount power of a federal administrative agency. 7
All this is not to argue that state judicial and adminisSee note 31 supra.
One of the most deplorable consequences which might be expected
from acceptance of the general pre-emption doctrine by the Supreme Court
would be a situation like that prevailing among state courts in picketing cases
70

73

after the

loose and

general

association

made between

picketing

and

free

speech in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093
(1940).

Some

courts

simply disregarded

Thoinhill; some

gave it

more
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trative agencies generally have concurrent jurisdiction over
the unfair labor practices defined in the Taft-Hartley Act.
The situation is more complicated than that. To this point
the argument has been designed only to call attention to the
fallacies and oversimplifications of the pre-emption doctrine as currently advanced, and to establish a context for
serious analysis of the degree to which the existing legal
structure - the Constitution, the Taft-Hartley Act and
the relevant Supreme Court precedents - permits of or
forbids participation of state authorities in the enforcement
and development of the national labor policy. To this matter we now turn.
III.
The Area of Permissible and Desirable
State Participation
A. Conflicting State Law:
Where a state law is in conflict with federal law, obviously the state law must bow. The Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution is definitive on -this point. Thus the Supreme Court has held that a state statute which provides
for a forfeiture of rights clearly granted by a federal statute
and lying at the heart of national policy cannot be enforced, whether the forfeiture be of rights to bargain
collectively 72 or to engage in a peacefully conducted strike
for higher wages. 73 With these cases there can be no real
quarrel. Promotion of collective bargaining by duly authorized unions is the central feature of current federal labor
relations policy, and the right to engage in a peacefully
weight than the Supreme Court itself was later to give it; others scarcely
knew what to make of it, and were understandably belligerent. Pretty much
the same sort of undesirable reactions might be expected under general preemption, especially in view of the eccentric exceptions already made bi the
pre-emptionists themselves.
Cf. Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the
Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct, 2 LAn. L.J. 355 (1951).
72 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782 (1945).
73 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street etc. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364 (1951);
International Union of United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454, 70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978 (1950).
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and otherwise lawfully conducted strike for higher wages
or for any other lawful objective is of only slightly inferior
stature. The most important case in point at this juncture
is probably the Wisconsin Public Utilities case,7 4 where the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute
outlawing strikes and substituting compulsory arbitration
in public-utilities labor disputes. 75 The pre-emptionists are
fond of citing this case as the one which "establishes" their
doctrine of complete federal pre-emption in the field of
labor relations. Of course it does no such thing. At most,
this case and its predecessor, O'Brien7 6 establish the practical fact that any state regulation of a peaceably conducted strike for higher wages is bound to conflict with or
unnecessarily duplicate the -thoroughgoing and extensive
federal regulation of such strikes. 77 On the narrowest construction, the case stands only for the completely indisputable proposition that a state law which forbids a peaceful
strike for higher wages by employees under federal jurisdiction must bow because of its obvious conflict with the
federal law's guarantee of the right to engage in such
strikes.78 There is much pre-emption language in the case,
but the import of this language vanishes upon careful ex-

74 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street etc. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment

Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364 (1951).
75

WIS.

STAT.

C.

111, §§ 50-65 (1951).

International Union of United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978 (1950), holding unconstitutional a
Michigan statute which established pre-strike procedures at variance with the
76

NLRA generally and particularly with the procedures established in § 8(d)

of the NLRA.

That decision, too, contains pre-emption language, but major

attention was given to the actual conflicts between the state and federal law.

Thus the analysis of the Wisconsin case, in the text above, applies equally
to the O'Brien case.
77 The Wisconsin decision carefully sets forth the extensive, almost exhaustive, regulations of the Taft-Hartley Act in connection with peacefully
conducted strikes for higher wages. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street etc. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 389-90, 71
S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364 (1951).
78 Id., 340 U.S. at 398.
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amination of the authority upon which it rests.7 9 Further-

more, simple intelligence still commands -that the general
language of an opinion be read in the light of the facts
of the case and the issues as seen by the Court. "We," the
Chief Justice carefully pointed out, "deal only with the
question of conflicting federal legislation as we have found
that issue dispositive .
.
On still another approach,
such pre-emption language as the case contains is entirely
justified in -the light of the conduct in question -a
lawfully conducted strike for higher wages. For the fact is
that regulation of this narrow type of human activity by
the federal government is complete; it has literally been
pre-empted. Thus there is no quarrel here with the statement made in O'Brien and repeated in the Wisconsin case:
" 'None of these sections [of the Taft-Hartley Act] can be
read as permitting concurrent state regulation of peaceful
strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this field and
closed it to state regulation.' "81 The "this" in the last sentence clearly refers to "regulation of peaceful strikes for
higher wages." Unlike the pre-emptionists, the Supreme
Court observes moderation in the use of such vague terms
79 E.g., "Congress knew full well that its labor legislation 'preempts the
field that the act covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the act
is concerned'. . . ." Id., 340 U.S. at 397-98. The Court is quoting here from
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947).
The quotation is not
persuasive as an argument for pre-emption by the Taft-Hartley Act. It was
written in connection with a bill which never became law; moreover, a bill
which had very little to do with the contours of the law which ultimately
passed. The House Bill, H.R. 3020, went far, far beyond the Senate Bill,
S. 1126, whose structure and approach were ultimately passed in the TaftHartley Act. In addition to all the features of the Taft-Hartley Act, H.R.
3020 would have abolished the NLRB [§3], outlawed "monopolistic" strikes
and industry-wide strikes [ § 12 (a) (3) ], detailed appropriate subjects of
collective bargaining and the procedure of collective bargaining [ § 2 (11) ],
regulated in detail the internal affairs of unions [ § 7 (b)], and made exhaustive provision for so many other matters not covered by the Taft-Hartley
Act that we do not have space here even to list them. It is out of order,
therefore, to attribute pre-emptions to the Taft-Hartley Act on the basis of
language used to describe a far more thoroughgoing bill which never became
law.
80 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street etc. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 388-89, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364 (1951).
81 Id., 340 U.S. at 390.
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as "field." When it says "field" it means the field which
it has defined with precision.
It makes little difference, then, whether we say that
regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages has been
pre-empted by the Federal Government or that state regulation of such strikes must bow under the Supremacy
Clause because it conflicts with federal regulation. The
results and even the basic thinking in both cases are the
same. As stated earlier in this paper, the proper conception of the pre-emption doctrine is precisely that which
ousts state action only when it presently or potentially conflicts with federal action, when it needlessly and vexatiously duplicates such action, or when the Federal Govemment has expressly excluded state participation whether
consistent or not. Demonstrating the Supreme Court's
agreement with this conception, the O'Brien and Wisconsin
Public Utilities cases tell us that peaceful strikes for higher
wages are regulated and privileged by federal law to such
a degree that there is simply no room for state action in
regard to them.
In the Briggs-Stratton case,8 2 however, we have the
Supreme Court's own word for it that the states may still
regulate strikes which are neither regulated nor privileged
by federal law, so long as the basis of regulation lies in the
method or the objective of the strike, and not in the mere
fact that it is a strike. Pre-emptionists have a good deal
of trouble with the Briggs-Stratton case. Professor Cox, s 3

for example, has repeatedly failed to understand that
Briggs-Strattonmakes the one great point that not all concerted labor activities are immunized by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act simply because of their
quality of concert. Perhaps the reason for the failure of
82 International Union, U.A.W.A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651 (1949) (upholding the
right of a state to outIaw "quickie" strikes left unregulated by federal law).
0 Cox and Seidman, supra note 2, at 232-34; Cox, supra note 2, at
335-38. We shall take up this matter in more detail in part C, infra.
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the pre-emptionists to register understanding of this relatively simple feature of Briggs-Stratton lies in the fact that
it blows a gaping hole in their position. For the case means
that there is room for state regulation of strikes and other
concerted action so long as the states do not attempt to
outlaw such action simply because it is concerted, and so
long as the state regulation does not clash with federal
regulation, as did the Michigan strike-vote law and the
Wisconsin compulsory-arbitration statute.
The Briggs-Stratton case is valuable also because it
squarely faces another troublesome problem - that of
whether there is an implicit conflict every time a state
regulates a form of concerted action which is not regulated
at all by federal law. One might argue, it must be conceded, that the combination in the federal law of (1) a
guarantee of the right to engage in concerted activities,
and (2) the regulation of some concerted activities,
meant on the whole that those concerted activities not
regulated by the federal law should be considered immunized. Or, to put .the matter another way, one might argue
that there is a conflict every time that a form of conduct
not unlawful under federal law is made unlawful by state
law. This possibility is laid to rest by the Briggs-Stratton
case, for there the Supreme Court upheld the State of Wisconsin's outlawing of strike action which was left unregulated by the federal law. Perhaps the profoundest significance of the Briggs-Stratton case lies in the fact that it
leaves the states free to continue their common-law development of a code of permissible objectives of union action.
But of this more later in part C. At present it is necessary
to complete the analysis relating to conflicting state action.
Beyond any question, the situation which presents the
greatest potentiality of conflict is that involving the selection of employee representatives. This process is controlled,
under both state and federal labor relations acts, by admin-
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istrative agencies which are endowed as a rule with considerable discretionary leeway in regard to the selection of
appropriate bargaining units, the determination of employee eligibility to vote, and consideration as to whether
or not there is an existing question of representation. It is
self-evident that where two or more deciding tribunals
exercise discretionary powers, and where the alternatives
available are numerous, as they are in representation pro84
ceedings, the probability of conflicting choices is great.

Hence the Supreme Court's decisions in Bethlehem Steel 5
and La Crosse Telephone,8 6 to the effect that state labor
relations boards may not entertain representation petitions
in industries over which the National Board has jurisdiction, seem eminently sensible, and explicable entirely on
the basis of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, without
the necessity of resort to the hopelessly vague and inchoate
concept of pre-emption by mere occupation of the "field."
This analysis reconciles all the cases, and leaves only one
loose thread, the Court's four-word per curiam decision in
the Plankinton case8 7 - a case which involved an unfairpractice charge. Our first instinct is to treat this case as
summarily as the Supreme Court did. The Court scarcely
measures up to its tremendously important role when, in a
subject matter so freighted with significance and plagued
with confusion as the present one, it vacates the decision of
a state's highest court with the cryptic declaration, "The
judgment is reversed." However, -the facts that the per
curiam decision cited Bethlehem Steel and La Crosse and
84 In fact, even the statutes themselves contain numerous conflicting rules
in regard to the selection of bargaining representatives. See Smith, supra
note 2, at 620-21, especially notes 60 and 61.
85 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234 (1947).
86 La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 18, 69 S.Ct. 379, 93 L.Ed. 463 (1949).
For detailed support of

the conclusion that these cases go off on the conflict issue, see Petro. State
Jurisdiction to Regulate Violent Picketing, 3 LAB. L.J. 3, 73-74 (1952).
87 Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,

338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491, 94 L.Ed. 588 (1950).
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that later, in the Wisconsin Public Utility case, the Chief
Justice took occasion to "explain" Plankinton,do provide a
basis of analysis. In -terms of our understanding of Bethlehem Steel and La Crosse as sketched above, the citation
of those cases in the Plankinton per curiam decision suggests that in the latter the Court was merely extending
the principle of those cases to an instance where a state
administrative agency took jurisdiction of an unfair-practice charge. If this be the true analysis of Plankinton, the
decision seems fairly sound; it is by no means unthinkable
that administrative agencies, relying as they do on discretion and expertise, might often differ even in the relatively
more definite and circumscribed unfair-practice cases.
However, there is also another possible explanation. Since
Plankinton involved facts which added up to unfair practices under the NLRA as well as under the state labor
relations act, Section 10(a) of the NLRA is relevant. That
section, with which we shall presently deal in more detail,
generally provides that the NLRB's power to prevent the
unfair practices defined in the Act is not to be affected by
the action of any other agency. As we shall see, this may
well mean that state labor boards are precluded from taking jurisdiction over any unfair-practice charge which is
subject ,to the' jurisdiction of the national board, as was
the charge in Plankinton. Thus there are at least two explanations of Plankinton which are satisfactory entirely
without resort to the general pre-emption doctrine.
The matter might be left here except for the complications raised by the Chief Justice's later "explanation" of
the case. In a footnote in the Wisconsin Public Utility
case, the Chief Justice had this to say of Plankinton:88
. . . [In Plankinton] the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board had, with the approval of the State Supreme Court,
88

Amalgamated Ass'n of Street etc. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment

Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 390 n. 12, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364 (1951).
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ordered reinstatement of an employee discharged because of
his failure to join a union, even though his employment was
not covered by a union shop or similar contract. Section 7
of the Labor Management Relations Act not only guarantees the right of self-organization and the right to strike,
but also guarantees to individual employees the 'right to
refrain from any or all of such activities,' at least in the
absence of a union shop or similar contractual arrangement
applicable to the individual. Since the N.L.R.B. was given
jurisdiction to enforce the rights of the employees, it was
clear that the Federal Act had occupied this field to the exclusion of state regulation. Plankinton and O'Brien both
show that states may not regulate in respect to rights guaranteed by Congress in § 7.

The last two sentences make all the trouble. In the penultimate sentence, the Chief Justice seems to imply that no
state may in any way regulate concerning the rights of
employees, and this is of course pre-emption of the most
extreme sort. But the last sentence takes it all back, and
ultimately asserts no more than was made perfectly clear
by Briggs-Stratton; namely, that the states may not regulate activities protected by Section 7 of the NLRA, but
that they may regulate all activities not protected by Section 7. The point is important enough to justify elaboration. If Plankinton stands for extreme pre-emption, then
no state authority - legislative, judicial or administrative
-may in any way deal with cases involving the employee
rights mentioned in Section 7 of the NLRA. Whether the
state treatment is consistent or inconsistent, or presently or
potentially in conflict makes no difference; the fact that
the general subject covered by Section 7 is involved in the
case completely vitiates state action. Thus, under this interpretation, not even a state court could enjoin minority
picketing for immediate recognition where no other union
has been certified; and this would be so even though such
picketing is not an NLRA unfair practice and is probably
not a protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the

STATES' PARTICIPATION IN NAT'L LABOR POLICY 35

NLRA.8 9 In short, the state action would be precluded
despite the absence of a present of even potential conflict
with the NLRA, and despite the fact that it would really
effectuate the national policy against restraint or coercion
by union and employers; for minority picketing for immediate recognition does involve both direct coercion by the
picketing union and an indirect attempt by that union to
cause the employer to coerce his employees' choice of representatives. 90
On -the other hand, if the last sentence of the Chief
Justice's "explanation" of Plankinton be the true explanation no such drastic results would follow; Plankinton would
then march along with Bethlehem Steel, La Crosse, BriggsStratton, O'Brien, and the Wisconsin Public Utility case all standing for the proposition that state regulation must
bow where it is either actually or potentially in conflict
with the federal law.
In the circumstances, the choice as to the meaning of
Plankinton, and of the Chief Justice's explanation, ought
to be clear for disinterested students. A per curiam holding with no legal analysis ought not to make new law of
a most significant sort, certainly not when the new law is
really proposed in an ambiguous footnote-explanation of
the per curiam decision in a later case. The fair function
of a per curiam decision is to dispatch a case on the basis
of the existing precedents, and this is what the Supreme
Court seems to have done in Plankinton by citing Bethlehem and La Crosse, both of which went off on the point
of actual or potential conflict between the state and federal laws.91
89 Cf. Feldblum, supra note 2, at 193 et seq.

90 Building Service Employees International Union
Cf. Petro,
532, 70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045 (1950).
Recognition, 2 LAB. L.J. 723 (1951), Recognition of
NLRA, 2 LAB. L.J. 803 (1951), State Jurisdiction to
Picketing, 2 LAB. L.J. 883 (1951).
91 See note 86 supra.

v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
Picketing for.Union
Picketing Under the
Control Recognition
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B. Consistent State Law:
Other things being equal, it would seem to follow as a
matter of course that there should be room for state action
in the labor relations field where such action is consistent
with federal law. Physical and fiscal limitations on federal
agencies, the greater familiarity of state agencies with
local problems, the greater speed with which troublesome
dispute-situations could be met -all these would dismiss
as a regressive nationalistic fetishism an insistence upon
the ouster of state action which could only make more
effective the national labor policy. As usual, however,
other things are not equal. Such decisions as Plankinton
and such statutory provisions as Section 10(a) of the
NLRA suggest that at least state labor relations boards
may not take jurisdiction in interstate situations even
under consistent state law. Although state statutes may be
consistent on their face with federal statutes, the fact that
both are administered by agencies which possess considerable "discretion" creates a strong potential of conflict.
Then too, -there is the problem of conflicting remedies,
present or potential, even where state and federal substantive laws are the same. The rule for state participation in
the enforcement of national labor policy must be drawn
from these tangled variables.
For present purposes we shall assume that Plankinton
is an application of Section 10(a) of the NLRA, and that
the case and the section establish that state labor relations
boards may not pass upon unfair-practice charges under
provisions of state labor relations acts which are identical
to the national act. 2 This -assumption leaves the problem
of whether the case and the section preclude the assumption of jurisdiction by state courts under state law, common
92 For further development of this point see Petro, State Jurisdiction to
Regulate Violent Picketing, 3 LAB. L.J. 3, 69 et seq. (1952).
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or statutory, over types of human conduct which amount
to unfair practices under the NLRA.
In Costaro v. Simons,9 3 the New York Court of Appeals
seems to have held that in such a situation the complaining party must exhaust his administrative remedies under
the national legislation before seeking relief in a state court
under common-law sanctions. The case involved conduct
by a union which amounted to both an unfair practice
under the NLRA and a tort under New York common
law. Other courts have gone beyond the position thus
taken by the New York Court of Appeals to hold that
they simply have no jurisdiction in a case which involves
conduct violative of both state law and the NLRA. 94 Presumably such courts would not take jurisdiction even if the
NLRB, in the exercise of its apparently unreviewable discretion, should refuse to assume jurisdiction. At least one
court has recently gone to the opposite extreme, however,
holding that it had jurisdiction to pass upon an alleged
violation of the NLRA itself.9 5 Citing the local significance of the dispute involved, this court was completely
unembarrassed by the fact that the conduct in issue was
apparently not violative of state law and that the only
source of sanction was the NLRA, whose administration is
normally thought to be the primary, if not exclusive, responsibility of the National Labor Relations Board.
Aside from the pre-emption argument and the superficial nationalism which it represents, there are only two
factors which tend to make questionable the exercise of
jurisdiction by state courts under state law over human
conduct which also violates the NLRA. The first of these
93 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.(2d) 454 (1951).
94 Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.(2d) 94 (1950).
95 Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter
Erection Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 So.(2d) 112 (1951), cert. granted, 343 U.S.
962, 72 S.Ct. 1061, 96 L.Ed. 1360, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
....U.S....., 73 S.Ct. 196, 97 L.Ed. *127 (1952).
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factors is Section 10(a) of the NLRA, which provides as
follows: 96
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
(listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall
not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law,
or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered by
agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede
to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
(other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and
transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases
by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent
therewith.

The argument that this section precludes state-court action
against the types of conduct outlawed in Section 8 of the
NLRA has some technical merit, so long as attention is directed superficially to the words of the section and diverted
from the general thrust of the section and its background.
The section does say that the power of the NLRB to prevent the unfair practices listed in Section 8 is not to be
affected by any other method of adjustment. Furthermore,
it is only an accident, for purposes of the present discussion, that the second sentence does not read "This power
shall be exclusive." For the word "exclusive," contained in
the corresponding section of the Wagner Act, was dropped
in the present version for reasons having nothing to do
with the state-federal problem. 97 Hence, for present purposes, we should read the second sentence as if it contained
the word "exclusive."
However, it is submitted that real understanding of the
96 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. 1952).
9T Cf. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union of America,
167 F.(2d) 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1948).
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purpose of the section, even reading in the word "exclusive," can commence only by noting what the section does
not say. The section does not say that "The Board is exclusively empowered to hear and decide all cases involving
the types of human conduct which amount to the unfair
practices listed in Section 8." And the fundamental reason why the section does not so read is that its framers
never thought in terms of excluding court proceedings
under state law, common or statutory. The framers of the
Wagner Act originally wrote the section. When they wrote
it the Act contained no restrictions on union conduct, and
at that time no state court could have jurisdiction over
employer conduct in labor relations, which was the only
type of conduct outlawed by the Wagner Act; for there
was simply no common or statutory law restraining employer conduct of the type outlawed in the Wagner Act.
Clearly, therefore, the section could not have been originally drafted with preclusion of state-court action in mind
since there was no reason to suppose that state courts.
would take any case involving Wagner Act uifair prac-

tices.

98

The remainder of the language in the first part of Section 10(a) (preceding the proviso) bears out this analysis.
Note the words "prevent," "adjustment" and "prevention."
These are not the words one would use if one wished to
preclude the normal activity of courts. Courts do not "prevent" or "adjust." They simply adjudicate, giving relief
in the form of judgments and decrees. Viewing the section
as a whole, and in terms of the administrative-law approach controlling when the Wagner Act was drafted, it
seems a virtual certainty that the section was designed
simply to insure that the Board set up by the Act would
not be hampered by private agreements between employers, unions and employees, or by the conduct of other ad98 Professor Smith comes to a similar conclusion after analyzing the
legislative history of the Wagner Act. Smith, supra note 2, at 606 n. 28.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

ministrative agencies then active in the federal field. 99
That the same considerations were probably controlling
in the Eightieth Congress, which passed the Taft-Hartley
Act and added the proviso in Section 10(a), can readily
be demonstrated.1 0 0 As to background, it is settled that
the Eightieth Congress was preoccupied, in rewriting the
section, with two factors, both completely bound up with
state labor relations boards, not state courts: first, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bethlehem case, 10 1 emphasizing the possibility of cession agreements between the
national board and state boards, and second, the fact that
the state labor relations acts, administered by administrative agencies, were by and large of the Wagner Act type,
containing no sanctions against labor unions and fully protecting the rights of supervisors to organize and bargain
collectively. The Eightieth Congress was concerned only
with seeing that their own restrictions on union action and
their other refinements of the Wagner Act would not be
undercut by state agencies ;112 hence the absolute preclu99 Ibid. Cf. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Rueping Leather Co.,
228 Wis. 473, 279 N.W. 673 (1938), which contains an excellent analysis of
both the text of § 10 (a) and its background.
100 Professor Smith seems inclined to think that § 10 (a) in Taft-Hartley
goes further than § 10 (a) in Wagner in ousting state-court jurisdiction.
Smith, supra note 2, at 611-13. But his inclination rests fundamentally on
the statement in the House Committee Report quoted and discussed in note
79 supra. Aside from that statement, Smith thinks that the balance of the
evidence is against preclusion of state-court action by § 10 (a). Since we
have demonstrated in note 79, supra, the weakness of reliance upon that
statement for the meaning of § 10 (a) in Taft-Hartley, we assume that we
have Professor Smith on our side on this issue. And we add to our own
his argument: "At the same time note should again be taken of the ambiguity
of section 10 (a). If it had been intended to suspend the operation of the
state police power in the field of management-union relations, except as otherwise expressly provided or as necessarily implied it would seem that clear
language to this end would have been used in view of the importance of the
result. Legislators who were trying to produce some 'equity' or 'balance' in
the federal labor relations law cannot reasonably be credited with an unexpressed intention to free unions (or for that matter employers) from state
restrictions." Smith, supra note 2, at 613.
101 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234 (1947).
102 SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6, 10-12, 26 (1947).
There is virtually no discussion in the Senate Report of preclusion of statecourt action; in such circumstances Professor Smith's remarks, quoted note
100 supra, seem especially pointed.
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sion of state-agency action in any of the nationwide industries mentioned (mining, manufacturing, etc.). Finally, a
more attentive textual analysis will conclusively demonstrate that the Eightieth Congress could scarcely have been
thinking of precluding action by state courts: there is no
way in which the NLRB could cede jurisdiction to state
courts. Thus the proviso, the only addition to 10(a) made
by the Eightieth Congress, must have been conceived entirely without reference to action in state courts.
Neither the grant of authority to the NLRB preceding
the proviso, -then, nor the proviso concerning cession of
jurisdiction to state agencies itself can straightforwardly be
read in terms of preclusion of action in state courts. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to note, moreover, the greatest nonlegal weakness inherent in any suggestion to the effect that
the Eightieth Congress meant to preclude state-court
action. State courts are likely to be involved in labor disputes only on petition to restrain one or another form of
unlawful union action. To suggest that the Eightieth Congress meant to inhibit such state-court intervention in labor
10 3
disputes may be clever, but it is not persuasive.
Although there is thus nothing in Section 10(a) which
precludes state-court action, based on state common-law or
statutory sanctions similar to the unfair labor practices defined in Section 8 of the NLRA, another argument has
been advanced for precluding state-court action. This is
the contention that the procedures and sanctions against
conduct amounting to unfair practices are different in
state courts from what they are under the NLRA. Thus,
the argument runs, a state court may grant an immediate
injunction or damages on suit by a private party, whereas
no private party may directly secure an injunotion, or even
damages as a matter of personal right, if he proceeds under
103

Professor Smith has put the same point slightly differently.

100 supra.

See note
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the NLRA. In fact, this argument proceeds, the Eightieth
Congress deliberately withheld from private parties the
right to secure direct injunctive relief against even the
types of union conduct with which the Eightieth Congress
was most concerned.
There are a number of deficiencies in this line of argument. In the first place, proposals the Eightieth Congress
may have rejected become irrelevant once it is accepted
that the Congress had no intention ,to abolish state-court
jurisdiction. Moreover, as the disinterested pre-emptionists themselves state, a rejection of a proposal in Congress
cannot, without more, invalidate a similar state measure. 10 4
Clinching the point, Professor Smith offers the case of a
proposal 'by a Michigan Congressman for incorporation in
federal law of an existing Michigan provision. 10 5 If the

proposal is rejected in the federal system, can it be sotndly
argued that the existing Michigan law is thereby invalidated?
Again, permitting private parties to secure direct injunctive relief against unfair practices would have involved
highly complex legislative action in the Eightieth Congress.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act would have had to be amended,
and this would have been by no means a simple job. Yet,
the fact that the Congress did not wish to undertake this
job. once again is absolutely no sign, in and of itself, that
injunctions in state courts should be precluded. So positive
and significant a limitation on state action cannot be inferred from a dubious, equivocal negative in Congress.
But the pre-emptionists insist that the control of all the
types of human conduct which amount to unfair practices
under the national legislation must be vested in the National Labor Relations Board if we are to have a uniform,
104
105

Cox and Seidman, supra note 2, at 224 et seq.
Smith, supra note 2, at 613 n. 44.
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1 6
symmetrical development of the national labor policy.'
For the state courts to take jurisdiction in unfair-practice
cases (and we must remember at this point that only two
or three types of union unfair practices are involved) would
be to frustrate, embarrass and confuse such a development,
it is urged. In support, they cite as their strongest example
the case where a union pickets for recognition. Such
action is an unfair practice under the NLRA only, according to current law, where another union is certified. 0 7
Only the NLRB, say the pre-emptionists, is in a solid position to tell whether the "in" union's certification is still
valid; and thus it becomes obvious that it is virtually necessary to leave the NLRB with exclusive jurisdiction in all
the unfair-practice cases, because they all involve similarly complex problems.
There is neither space nor time for an exhaustive analysis here of all the deficiencies in this set of contentions.
However, as to the very case cited, two things may be
noted. First, an existing certification is required before
minority picketing for recognition becomes unlawful under
the NLRA; that is the only requirement of Section 8(b)
(4) (C). 108 The problem of whether the existing certification remains a valid one at the time of the picketing is one
which the NLRB itself has engrafted on the provision. Now
a state court is in as good a position as anyone else to
decide whether there is an existing certification, and its
jurisdiction should not be precluded merely because the
NLRB has added other requirements. If there is doubt
106 So, at any rate, do Cox and Seidman, supranote 2, argue. However,
NLRB Assistant General Counsel Mozart Ratner seemed to take the position
at the N.Y.U. Fifth Annual Conference on Labor that pre-emption was
required by the broad considerations of federalism, whatever that may mean.
We, on the other hand, insist that pre-emption is bad from either point of
view-that both federal-state relations and the orderly enforcement and development of labor policy will suffer if the current pre-empion argument
prevails.
107 Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
108 For a detailed analysis of § 8 (b) (4) (C), see Koretz, Minority
Pressure Vis-a-Vis Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 2 SYRAcusE L.
REv. 294, 303 et seq. (1951).
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of the representative status of the certified union, the doubt
may be resolved under the representation procedures set up
by the Act specifically for that purpose; the doubt is not
resolved by aggressive picketing, and the state courts
should be allowed, under appropriate state law, to forbid
the picketing. The Board should not be allowed to expand
its powers and jurisdiction by its own fiat, even though
such is the apparently normal conduct of all administrators, executives and agencies.
It must be emphasized, in the second place, that the
example cited is of extremely narrow thrust. Even if some
force be attributed to it, the impact vanishes, for example,
in cases where no such matters as the validity of existing
certifications are involved. And, by and large, with the
obvious exception of Section 8(b) (5),109 most of the
union unfair practices do not involve such "discretionary"
matters; most are tolerably tightly drawn, and at least as
easily understood by state judges as by the NLRB - in
fact, more easily understood by state judges if the Board's
record thus far on application of the Taft-Hartley sanctions against unions is any sign of its understanding of the
Act. For a far more basic weakness in the present preemptionist argument is its virtuous emphasis on the necessity of sole responsibility of the NLRB in the development
and enforcement of a uniform national labor policy.
Whether for lack of appropriations, personnel, or other
reasons, the National Labor Relations Board's own deficiencies represent the greatest current obstacle to the effective enforcement of the national labor policy--the whole
national policy, that is - which consists in essentially equal
portions of a desire to promote collective bargaining, to
protect the right of employees not to engage in union activities as well as to engage in such activities, and to outlaw employer and union unfair practices. In terms of
109 This section leaves with the NLRB considerable discretionary leeway
in deciding when union initiation fees are "excessive" or "discriminatory."
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either the physical handling of cases covered by the Act
or the substantive enforcement of the kct's procedures and
provisions, the Board's record is scarcely a proud one. In
fact, the case for arguing that the Board has virtually
vetoed the essential features of the Eightieth Congress'
additions to the national labor policy has enough strength
that it should be presented here, in summary form, for
the consideration of all disinterested analysts.
The Board's decisions on assumption or rejection of jurisdiction, once it had established its right to use "discretion" in this matter largely on the basis of the argument
that confusion would thus be avoided, are so confusing
that no one has been able to reconcile them. 110 Infinitely
more important, the Board has erected a set of standards
which goes a long way toward eliminating the building and
construction industry from the coverage of the Act -a
fact the impact of which can be understood only when
one appreciates two further facts: (1) that union unfair
practices occur perhaps more frequently there than in any
other industry, and (2) that union unfair practices in the
building and construction industry were one of the major

targets of the Eightieth Congress in the Taft-Hartley
Act.1" ' Again, in a complicated series of moves, the Board
110 See note 26 supra.
111 Cf. Nicholas Palladino, 95 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1951); Joliet Contractors

Ass'n, 90 N.L.R.B. 542 (1950).
The Board nowhere identifies the source of
its authority to waive jurisdiction over boycotts in this industry in the face
of the mandate in § 10 (1) to seek injunctive relief against all the conduct
outlawed in § 8 (b) (4) (A).
Cf. Comments, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 899
(1952); 60 YALE L.J. 673 (1951).
The Board itself repeatedly asserted in
its early Taft-Hartley decisions that the union unfair practices in the building and construction industry were one of the specific targets of the Eightieth
Congress, and accordingly took jurisdiction of cases of minuscule financial
proportions--stressing, entirely properly, that the cumulative effects of the
unfair practices, if unchecked, would defeat the national policy against secondary union action. See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners,
80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948) (involving a home-remodeling job); International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 82 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1949) (involving a
$325 electrical subcontracting job).
Somehow, the effectuation of this
national policy became unimportant to the Board by 1950, when it declined
to take jurisdiction over a far more extensive boycott in Joliet Contractors
Ass'n, 90 N.L.R.B. 542 (1 9 50)-a decision which the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals went so far as to call an abuse of discretion, Joliet Contractors Ass'n
v. NLRB, 193 F.(2d) 833 (7th Cir. 1952).
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has effectively negatived the Congressional policy which
was designed to provide some relief for employers by permitting them to seek an election whenever faced with a
demand for recognition by a union, especially a non-majority union. Because this highly complicated matter has
been dealt with in detail elsewhere, we merely mention it
here, with the caveat that its importance far exceeds the
brief space we have given it.1'

The same frustration of congressional policy is evident
in the Board's restrictive interpretations of all the more
important union unfair labor practices added by the
Eightieth Congress to the national labor policy, in Sections
8(b) (1)-(6) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus Section 8(b)
(1) (A) of the Act, outlawing union restraint or coercion,
has been so narrowly construed by the Board that it is
impotent to outlaw the most widespread form of union
coercion of nonunion employees, namely, minority picketing for recognition or organizational purposes. 1 1 3 As to

8(b) (2), outlawing union coercion of employer discrimination against nonunion employees, the only completely
effective sanctions against such union actions- the injunction, and the back-pay award solely assessed against
the union-

have been used only rarely or not at all.1 14

With the approval of a Court of Appeals, 115 it must be
noted, the Board has declared that it lacks statutory power
to impose back-pay liability exclusively on the union, the
party basically responsible for such unlawful discriminaton.116 This construction simply cannot be justified on
112

Petro, Recognition Picketing Under the NLRA,

2 LAn. L.J. 803

(1951).
113 Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
The case for holding
minority picketing for recognition an unfair practice is developed in detail
in the articles cited in note 90 supra.

114 For one of the few cases in which the NLRB has sought injunctive
relief, see Jaffe v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 97 F. Supp. 443
(S.D. N.Y. 1951).
115 Progressive Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, 187 F.(2d) 298
(7th Cir. 1951).
118 Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 563 (1949).
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any straightforward analysis of the statute or of the underlying congressional policy. 11-7 We may skip Section 8(b)
(3), outlawing union refusals to bargain in good faith, as
the Board has virtually done; we shall never know how
productive this section might have been in terms of good
labor relations because no thoroughgoing attempt has been
made to cultivate it.11 8 As to Section 8(b) (4), outlawing
certain strikes and inducements to strike, this section has
been written down and rewritten by the Board so methodically 1 9 that even a highly sympathetic. Supreme Court
demurred.1 20 Section 8(b) (5), a well-intentioned but
random and unimportant measure designed to indicate
congressional disapproval of excessive and discriminatory

127 For development of this point see Petro, Union Liability for
Back Pay Under the NLRA, 2 LAB. L.J. 83 (1951). I should like here to
call especial attention to a student note published simultaneously with the
foregoing, Back Pay Awards Against Unions Under the LMRA, 51 COL. L.
REv. 508 (1951). This superior item of legal craftsmanship and disinterested
analysis more thoroughly documents the same argument, namely, that the
NLRB has plainly departed from both the written words of the Taft-Hartley
Act and its underlying intention. It is reassuring to find some law students
adhering stoutly to the principle of legislative supremacy in rule-and-policymaking, even where adherence to the principle means acceptance of some
effective rules for union action. The law reviews are full of excellent student
analyses of what the NLRB has done to pervert the purposes of the TaftHartley restrictions on unions; but it is dismaying to find that perhaps most
of these analyses either shrug their shoulders and acquiesce in the NLRB
program-e.g.,
Comments, 50 MICH. L. REV. 315 (1951), 50 MicH. L. REv.
899 (1 9 5 2 )-or
plainly prefer the NLRB course of action, as in the Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction
Industry, 60 YALE L.J. 673 (1951).
113 Cf. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 29 LAB. REL.
REF. MAN. 2230 (7th Cir. 1951).
319 See my articles in 1 LAB. L.J. 835, 1075 (1950); Comment, 50
Mici. L. REV. 315 (1951).
120 In NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 71 S.Ct.
961, 95 L.Ed. 1277 (1951), while agreeing with the Board as to the final
result, the Court declined to accept the Board's rationale that § 8 (b) (4)
prohibits only "secondary" and not "primary" labor activity. The variance
in interpretation between the Court and the Board creates confusion; it is
difficult to tell which Board decisions still stand. Cf. Comment, 50 MicH.
L. REV. 315 (1951). One thing seems clear: The administrative and judicial
amendments of § 8 (b) (4) make the section more difficult to apply than
it was when only the legislature had written it. See Petro and De Maio,
Labor Relations Law in 1951 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 298
(1952); and also my articles in 1 LAB. L.J. 835, 1075 (1950).
For an
engaging but startling assertion that the Supreme Court did not go far enough
in rewriting § 8 (b) (4) (A), see Frank, The United States Supreme Court:
1950-51, 19 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 165, 170-2 (1952).
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union initiation fees, has scarcely figured at all in NLRB
proceedings. But the process of cancellation of congressional purpose through clever manipulation of the words
used in the Act is perhaps nowhere more evident than in
the Board's construction of Section 8(b) (6), outlawing
union exactions for work not. performed or not to be performed. Here the Board has held that there is nothing
wrong in a union's forcing an employer to hire workers to
perform services he does not want performed.' 2 1
It seems perfectly plain from all this that we are not
getting and that we shall not get a coherent, straightforward development of the national labor policy from the
National Labor Relations Board. Both logic and experience suggest instead that we can expect from it only enforcement of NLRB policy, with all the shifts and turns
and political waverings which such a policy involves. Furthermore, lest it be thought that the present Board is a
particular target of criticism, we wish to let it be known
that the argument is directed, not to any particular Board,
but to the currently immature status of national labor policy, the chaotically erratic determinants of that policy, and
the susceptibility of administrative agencies generally in
such circumstances. Thus we return to the thread of the
analysis by emphasizing that it would be viciously irresponsible in these circumstances to oust the concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts. There is a single judicial head
of this nation. If what state courts do in human situations
which might also involve NLRA unfair practices is inconsistent with the national policy, rightly construed, the
United States Supreme Court has the function and the
duty of setting matters straight.
On the other hand, there is little merit in the argument
set aside,
121 Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1528 (1951),
The
Gamble Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 196 F.(2d) 61 (6th Cir. 1952).
Court of Appeals said, 196 F.(2d) at 63: "By the Board's order, the provisions of § 8 (b) (6) may be completely nullified by the mere assertion of
the union that it desires to perform."
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which points to the differences in procedures and remedies
prevailing between the NLRB and the state courts. If a
state court will immediately enjoin a secondary strike
which also violates Section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA, an
injunction is only what the Board itself should immediately
seek to secure anyway, under the direct mandate of the
Act. 2 2 If a state court will give damages for, say, unlawful
union discrimination, while the NLRB chooses to remedy
the unlawful act in some other way, no one can say that
the national labor policy has been frustrated by the variance in remedies; complaint would be sound only if the
state remedy were unjust or ineffective as a means of enforcement of national policy, and neither is ever suggested.
Finally, if a state court may issue an injunction without
delay in certain cases where the Board remedy would be a
cease-and-desist order after the normal period of a year or
so, we should merely have what we have always soughtexpeditious justice. Note the anomaly: the Board and its
protagonists complain of the relative speed in the state
courts when one of the two or three major piers under the
whole structure of administrative law was its original
promise of speedy justice.
The case for preclusion of state-court action based on
state law substantively consistent with federal law is a case
which argues in the voice of doctrinaire nationalism but
which is actually designed to frustrate the congressionally
established national labor policy; it pretends to be concerned with the effective development of the national labor
policy but is actually concerned with vitiating one-half of
that policy. Preclusion of state-court action would mean
one thing today, on the whole, and only one thing: the
national policy against union unfair practices would become to a considerable extent defunct. No law-not the
Constitution, not the Taft-Hartley Act, and certainly not
122

Section 10 (1).
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the existing Supreme Court precedents -requires
preclusion of consistent action by the state courts. And if we
think it the function of law to enforce the congressionally
declared national labor policy, the proper result should not
be in doubt. No state court should be obliged, as the Minnesota Supreme Court felt it was, 12 3 completely to dismiss
an action brought under state law merely because the conduct in question might also violate the NLRA. At most, a
state court should, as the New York Court of Appeals has
done, 2 4 hold the case in abeyance for a reasonable period
to give the NLRB a chance to accept or reject it.
On the other hand, the considerations are more evenly
balanced where a case is brought to a state court and it is
based, not on state common or statutory law, but on the
NLRA itself.' 2 5 The statutory language and the decisions
seem to establish that the Board was to have exclusive
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Act itself, 2 6 something which may seem conclusive to some. However, there
is another side to the argument. The statutory language
and the decisions in point originated in the Wagner Act,
which was not at all concerned with union unfair practices.
These unfair practices are more overt, more precisely defined and more amenable on the whole to traditional judicial process than the employer unfair practices with which
the Wagner Act was exclusively concerned. Furthermore,
the general policy considerations heretofore advanced suggest on balance that the state courts be permitted to act,
in predominantly local situations at any rate. 127 In the
123

(1950).

Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W. (2d)

94

Costaro v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.(2d) 454 (1951).
Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter
Erection Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 So.(2d) 112 (1951), cert. granted, 343 U.S.
962, 72 S.Ct. 1061, 96 L.Ed. 1360, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
...... .U.S
73 S.Ct. 196, 97 L.Ed. *127 (1952).
126 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459,
82 L.Ed. 638 (1938).
127 Cf. Art Steel Co. v. Velazquez, 201 Misc. 141, 109 N.Y.S.(2d)
788
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
This case makes the suggestion, which may appeal to all
who are interested primarily in the enforcement of existing labor policy, that
124
125
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circumstances, the student's privilege is to recommend the
problem for solution to the Supreme Court.
C. Supplementary State Law:
There are, as has been stated earlier in this paper, many
aspects of labor relations with which the Taft-Hartley Act
is not concerned, many forms of union action which national legislation either does not control or has been held
not to control. A few examples will lend concreteness to
the discussion. Thus Taft-Hartley has nothing to say about
union membership policies, except in the indirect sense that
prior union membership may not be made a hiring condition in any interstate industry.1 28 It has been construed as
not outlawing the union coercion implicit in minority or
stranger picketing for organizational or recognition purposes.1 29 A union does not violate the Act, under current
construction, where it directly induces one employer to
cease doing business with another,1

30

even though such an

inducement usually emanates ultimately from the threat of
a strike, and even though, where such an inducement is
immediately predicated on a strike or threat of strike, the
NLRB will itself hold the inducement an unfair practice.131 Finally, the Act leaves completely unregulated
strikes, picketing and other boycott techniques which are
aimed at such diverse objectives as driving a firm out of
business, resisting technological change, or challenging
employer decisions in regard to plant location, type of
the state courts should have completely concurrent jurisdiction once the
determination of employee representation has been made by the NLRB.
Beyond selection of representatives, with its large discretionary areas, Justice
Di Falco maintains, there is no particular magic in exclusive NLRB jurisdiction to enforce national labor policy; judges can apply the rules relating to
permissible overt action as well as the NLRB. Of course there can be no
doubt that Justice Di Falco would draw the line at state laws conflicting
with federal law.
128 Section 8 (a) (3), NLRA as amended.
129 Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
130 Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.(2d) 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
131 Schenley Distillers Corp., 78 N.L.R.B. 504 (1948), enforcement
granted, 178 F.(2d) 584 (2d Cir. 1949).
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product to be produced, price policies and the other matters loosely comprehended under the admittedly vague
term, "management prerogatives."
As to each of these matters there is a more or less well
developed body of state law, both common and statutory.
Does the failure of the Taft-Hartley Act to deal with these
phases and details of conduct in labor relations mean that
the pre-existing state approaches can no longer be applied?
Naturally, the general pre-emption argument would answer in the affirmative, on the theory that Congress went
as far as it wished the law to go in the regulation of union
conduct. Of course, as we have seen, this position cannot
be sustained on any demonstrably rational grounds, 132 and
the pre-emptionists have in fact admitted its weakness by
making all sorts of exceptions based on evasive definitions
of the "field" of labor law.133 However, there are other
factors which must be considered in reaching a decision as
to whether state law supplementary to the federal law
may apply.
Here we must revert to a line of analysis broached
earlier in this paper. The first question which must be
settled is whether or not the Act itself or relevant Supreme
Court decisions preclude supplementary state action. Only
if that question may be answered in the negative is it of
practical significance to inquire into the desirability of state
action on subjects not dealt with in the Taft-Hartley Act.
The question may be recast in this form: Is every type
of union action not regulated by the Taft-Hartley Act
absolutely privileged against state regulation? The answer
depends largely upon the construction to be given to Sec13 4
tion 7 of the NLRA. That section reads as follows:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
132

See notes 104, 105 supra, and accompanying text.

133 See Part IH-B in text, supra.
134

61

STAT.

140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1952).
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through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).

For present purposes, the concluding portion of the first
independent clause of this provision is the crucial one the portion granting the right to engage in collective bargaining and other concerted activities. Generally speaking,
there are three distinct possibilities in construing this section in terms of the present discussion: 13 5
1. The section might be construed as prohibiting any
and all state restrictions on collective bargaining or other
concerted labor activities in interstate situations.
2. The section might be construed as prohibiting only
such state action as purports to outlaw collective bargaining and concerted activities in and of themselves, without
regard to the manner in which the activities are carried on
or their objectives.
3. The section might be construed as having nothing
at all to do directly with state action; it might be construed
as merely the theoretical premise on which the unfair practices, defined in the immediately subsequent sections of the
Act, were predicated.
Both common sense and the consistent course of decision
in the Supreme Court vitiate the first possibility; as we
shall soon see, even the National Labor Relations Board
has come to the conclusion that there are some labor activities which are neither expressly prohibited in Section
8(b) of the Act nor positively protected by Section 7
against Board disapproval and even state action. Of course
there could not long be doubt of thisultimate conclusion.
135 Cf. the different approach used in Cox, supra note 2.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

The opposite conclusion would have established for concerted union action a status of privilege which civilization
will formally accord to no individual or institution. It
would have meant literally a privilege for murder, so. long
as murder was for the mutual aid and protection of organized employees, and so long as the murder was accomplished by concerted action. Hence, even the NLRB, in
arguing that an employer should not be permitted to discharge sitdown strikers, although the strikers were obviously guilty of a violation of state law, never proposed that
36
they should be immune to prosecution under state law.'
And the Supreme Court confirmed this position in taking
the broader one that for an outright violation of state law
the employer might even discharge the strikers, on the
theory that an unlawful activity cannot be a protected
concerted activity within the meaning of Section 7.137 This
decision-

the famous Fansteel- thus becomes a seminal

one for our discussion. It establishes that not all activities
are privileged by Section 7 merely because they happen to
be the concerted activities of working men in a labor dispute. And in this proposition, the Supreme Court found a
solid basis for a number of other decisions, all closely
relevant here. The Court subsequently held that a strike
amounting to the crime of mutiny, 1 38 a strike to enforce
a violation of a collective agreement 39 and a strike conducted in an eccentric, seriatim fashion were not protected concerted activities.' 40 Learning from the Supreme
Court, the NLRB began developing the symmetrical theory
that concerted activities were protected by Section 7 only
138 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930 (1938).
137 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490,
83 L.Ed. 627 (1939).
138 Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 62 S.Ct. 886, 86
L.Ed. 1246 (1942).
139 NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508, 83
L.Ed. 682 (1939).
140 International Union, U.A.W.A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651 (1949) (the Briggs-Stratton
case).
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where they were conducted in a lawful manner and for a
lawful objective.1 41
This generalization immediately raises the question, however: On what basis do we decide whether the manner or
objective is lawful? We cannot say that the basis is to be
the Taft-Hartley Act, because it is the very silence of that
Act in so many instances which raises the problem. If we
were to rest on the Taft-Hartley Act we should be back
where we started, 'holding that all concerted activities not
restricted or otherwise dealt with by Taft-Hartley are absolutely privileged by Section 7 - and that, of course, is
14 2
If
the position which the Supreme Court has rejected.

not the Taft-Hartley Act, then, are we to rely on state law
for guidance as to which concerted activities, not restricted
by national law, are to be privileged against any other restriction? Obviously, this position must likewise be rejected,
in the broad form stated. The very inquiry in which we
are engaged involves the assumption that some concerted
activities are immune to state restriction; to say without
qualification that state law should determine the scope of
immunity would therefore be to beg the question. The final
possibility would be to leave the determination of legality
of manner and objectives largely to the NLRB and residually to the courts under the NLRA itself.' 4 3 As we shall

immediately see, however, this alternative seems likewise
unavailable, even if desirable.
The second construction of Section 7, as set forth above,
141 Cf. National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948);
American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
242 Professor Cox would probably differ on this point. Cox. supra note
2. But if the Briggs-Stratton case does not make this point it makes no
point at all, for there the Court held that § 7 did not prevent a state from
prohibiting a form of concerted action neither regulated nor indirectly impugned by the general policies of the Taft-Hartley Act.
143 This is the solution advanced by Professor Cox, with the proviso that
the Courts of Appeals exercise a proper restraint in reviewing NLRB decisions as to the proper scope of the protection of concerted activities. Cox,
supra note 2, at 346: "By virtue of its experience the Board should be better
versed in that than any other body." For a different view of the place of
"expertise" in the law of labor relations, see Petro, Employer Unfair Practices
Under the Taft-Hartley Act-Ill, 3 LAB. L.J. 387, 448 (1952).
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is probably the prevailing one today, and probably the
ultimately sound one, all things considered, although it
does leave hanging certain matters which can be accounted
for satisfactorily only by incorporating parts of the third
construction offered. In the Briggs-Stratton case, 144 which
we have already discussed at some length, the Supreme
Court rejected the contention that all concerted activities
not regulated by the Taft-Hartley Act are privileged by
Section 7 against state regulation. More important for
purposes of the immediate discussion, however, the Court
in Briggs-Stratton also rejected the contention that the
NLRB has exclusive authority to determine (a) which
concerted activities are absolutely privileged by Section 7,
(b) which are not privileged, and (c) which the states
may regulate. Instead, the Court stated, in an opinion
written by Justice Jackson, who cannot be called quite a
"states'-righter," that some activities not restricted by national law are still not privileged against state prohibition,
notwithstanding objections and contrary decisions by the
NLRB.1 4 5 So clearly, so often, and so forcefully did Justice Jackson make the point that the states are still free
to prohibit some concerted activities not prohibited by
Taft-Hartley, notwithstanding Section 7, that we must
46
quote his opinion at some length: 1
Congress has not seen fit in either [Wagner or Taft-Hartley]
...to declare either a general policy or to state specific rules
as to their effects on state regulation of various phases of
labor relations over which the several states traditionally

have exercised control.... [A]s to coercive tactics in labor
controversies, we have said of the National Labor Relations
Act what is equally true of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, that "Congress designedly left open an
area for state control" and that the "intention of Congress
14. International Union, U.A.W.A.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651 (1949).
145 Id., 336 U.S. at 255.
14s Id, 336 U.S. at 252-53, 257.
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to exclude States from exercising their police power must
be clearly manifested."
The... decisions [of the United States Courts of Appeals]
and our own . . . clearly interdict any rule by the Board

that every type of concerted activity is beyond the reach
of the states' adjudicatory machinery.

Thus the opinion, especially in the light of the actual
refusal to invalidate state action which outlawed a type
of concerted activity not prohibited by national law, seems
to establish beyond all doubt that there is room in the
labor relations "field" for state action which goes beyond
or supplements the national legislation. Perhaps the most
valuable feature of the opinion, however, is its admirable
and succinct formulation of the limitation on state action
which the basic thrust of Section 7 imposes. Justice Jackson did not allow himself to get caught in the circular argument that Section 7 immunizes against state action only
those concerted activities which the states themselves do
not care to regulate. Instead, masterfully establishing the
historical context and basic purpose of Section 7, Justice

Jackson described the section itself as a barrier to any
reversion by the states to the ancient and dubious doctrine
that labor unions are in and of themselves, without regard

to what they seek or how they seek it, unlawful conspir-

acies

147

In the light of labor movement history, the purpose of
. . . [Section 7] becomes clear. The most effective legal

weapon against the struggling labor union was the doctrine
that concered activities were conspiracies, and for that reason illegal. Section 7 . . . took this conspiracy weapon away

from the employer in employment relations which affect interstate commerce. No longer can any state, as to relations
withi reach of the Act, treat otherwise lawful activities
to aid unionization as an illegal conspiracy merely because
they are undertaken by many persons acting in concert.
But because legal conduct may not be made illegal by con147

Id., 336 U.S. at 257-58.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
cert, it does not mean that otherwise illegal action is made
legal by concert.

Remarkably enough, this most excellent and lucid prose
has proved unintelligible to so informed and literate a
scholar as Professor Archibald Cox, of Harvard. 148 While

it seems presumptuous to rephrase Justice Jackson's language, it may be helpful in the circumstances to note that
what he is saying is this: The states may no longer, as was
allegedly done in the Cordwainers' case, 1 4 9 for example,
outlaw a peacefully conducted strike for an entirely lawful
objective, solely and essentially on the ground that concerted action in and of itself is unlawful, and without
regard to the ends or means of the concerted action. Justice Jackson is saying here that the states may outlaw
union action which is not outlawed by the Taft-Hartley
Act if the state sanction proceeds from opposition to the
particular means used (i.e., violence or any other method
going beyond a clean-cut strike) or from disapproval of
the objective of the union action- always providing, of
course, that the state regulation does not conflict with
some specific provision of federal law, as it did in the
O'Brien case, where the state law established pre-strike
procedures which varied from and conflicted with those
of the Taft-Hartley Act. 150
Professor Cox may have been thrown off, ironically
enough, by his familiarity with labor law, which, understandably, is more intimate than that of Justice Jackson.
Professor Cox knows, as few other than the most informed
and disinterested of labor law students know, that the
criminal and civil conspiracy doctrines, so reviled and emphasized by the all too numerous demagogues in the field
148 Cox, supra note 2, at 335 et seq. and n. 70; Cox and Seidman, supra
note 2.
149 *Commonwealth v. Pullis (Phila. Mayor's Court 1806); 3 COMMONS,
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 60
(1910).
150 International Union of United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978 (1950).
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of labor relations, were really never very important features of the structure of American labor law. He knows
that perhaps not a single case involving sanctions against
union action was based on the conspiracy doctrine - notwithstanding dicta to the contrary in such old chestnuts as
the Cordwainers' case which, by the way, involved allegations of threats and violence by the unionists against the
nonunionists involved; he knows that disapproval of either
means or objective underlay virtually every injunction
issued against union action even if it was not expressed. 1 51
And with this knowledge, it becomes difficult of course to
attribute a great deal of cogency or meaning to Justice
Jackson's reading of the fundamental purpose of Section 7.
For Professor Cox and other learned students of labor law,
there is little significance, even little sense, in describing
Section 7 as a barrier against reversion to criminal conspiracy days, when those days existed exclusively in the
imagination of special pleaders, cursory students of labor
law, and most of those members of the general public who
think they know something about labor-law -history.
Unfortunately, however, the meaning of Section 7 is not
to be pieced out from the special insights available to a
few careful scholars. Section 7 must be understood, instead, in the light of the sentiments of the people who
had the most to do with labor-law developments in the
last twenty years or so. And they thought-and still do
think- that the "conspiracy" doctrine dominated labor
law until 1932. In this perspective, Justice Jackson's reasoning and exposition seem most cogent and persuasive.
Furthermore, the simple fact is that the framers of the
Taft-Hartley Act never thought of Section 7 as a complete
interdiction of state regulation of concerted activities.
151 "Those courts which spoke in the language of the law of conspiracy
generally held that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a conspiracy depended
upon its purpose and on the means which the combination invoked." Cox,
supra note 2, at 336.
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Conclusive on the point is the express acceptance in Section 13 of "limitations or qualifications" on the right to
strike. 152 If more evidence of conscious congressional acceptance of such limitation be needed, the most authoritative portions of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act provide an abundance.' 53 At most, Section 7 establishes as a polar proposition in American labor policy that
the right to bargain collectively and to take other concerted
action may not be vitiated in terms. The right may be
regulated, but it may not be abolished. States are free,
except where limited by specific provisions of the TaftHartley Act, to regulate the manner and objectives of
concerted action. The line is drawn at the point where
the states would outlaw all concerted action. That is what
Justice Jackson was saying in Briggs-Stratton.
Substantial accuracy exists, it is submitted, in the view
of Section 7 thus taken by Justice Jackson in the Briggs152 "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminisb in any way
the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (Supp. 1952). As a matter of
accurate analysis, § 13 should never be viewed as in any sense a restriction
on state action, as the Supreme Court seems to have viewed it in the Wisconsin Public Utilities case, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364 (1951),
for the section internally restricts itself to the NLRA alone. Furthermore
the concluding reference to "limitations or qualifications" on the right to
strike almost definitively establishes an intention to maintain qualifications
based on illegality of manner or objectives of concerted action. On this,
see SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947); and H.R. REP. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40, 59 (1947) (the bill as it finally passed),
quoted in part in the following footnote.
153 The Senate and House conferees, in reporting the compromise bill
which was to become law, said that they omitted in § 7 specifically to deny
protection to "unlawful concerted activities" partly because "the courts have
firmly established the rule that under the existing provisions of section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, employees are not given any right to engage
in unlawful or other improper conduct" and partly because "there was real
concern that the inclusion of such a provision might have a limiting effect
and make improper conduct not specifically mentioned subject to the protection of the act." H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1947).
The whole of this section of Report 510 should be read, and the opinion of
the NLRB in Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948), as well. In the
latter, the Board considered at some length the whole problem, and concluded
that some concerted activities are neither outlawed by the Act itself nor protected by § 7. In now assuming the pre-emptionist position, the NLRB seems
to have forgotten that it once conceded the existence of an open area between complete federal outlawry, on the one hand, and complete federal
immunization, on the other.
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Stratton case. Nevertheless that view does not seem to

tell the whole story. The third construction mentioned
above seems more satisfying, the whole structure of the
National Labor Relations Act considered. Viewing the Act
as a whole, it is difficult to think of Section 7 as being
directed, however narrowly, primarily toward state action,
even though it is clear that, under any view, Section 7, like
all federal statutes, must necessarily have the effect of imposing some limitation on the pre-existing freedom of the
states to enact otherwise constitutional legislation. Once a
federal statute is written, no state may make a conflicting
rule for a situation subject to federal jurisdiction; and because of this principle, Section 7 would necessarily affect
the states under any view. But this is different from saying
that Section 7 was primarily intended as a limitation on
state action.
The Wagner Act was one of the most carefully, artfully
and ably drafted statutes ever passed by Congress. There
are those who may criticize the generality of its language
and the great abdications of legislative power and responsibility which it reflected; but few will question that the
Act's general structure and actual wording were well designed to achieve the ultimate purpose, that all the parts
of the Act integrated in a well-knit whole. Section 7 can
be completely appreciated, therefore, only when its relationship to the rest of the statute is understood.
The statute was designed as single-mindedly as possible
to eliminate the economic power of the employer as a
barrier to the extensive unionization which it was the
policy of the Act to promote. The key provisions in the
promotion of this policy were Sections 7 and 8. Section 7
granted a right to form and join unions, to bargain collectively and to take part in other concerted activities.
Section 8, in subdivisions (1) to (5), went as far as artfully drafted legislation could go, short of eliminating the
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employer from the scene entirely, in outlawing the use by
the employer of his economic position as a means of discouraging or resisting unionization of his employees. Imbued with the precepts of the class struggle and the corol-.
lary that only the great economic power of employers
stood between employees and their desire for universal
unionization, the effective proponents of the Wagner Act
outlawed all forms of employer interference with the right
of self-organization.
Thus Section 7 seems more properly read as primarily
an integral feature of the general prohibition of employer
interference than as a limitation on the states. When so
read, it leaves as largely an open matter the degree to
which the states might regulate concerted labor activities;
and this is in fact the situation which obtained under the
Wagner Act. Few people questioned the right of the states
to regulate the manner and objectives of union action during the Wagner Act era. When they did, the Supreme
Court immediately set the matter straight. While it held
that no state could accomplish a forfeiture of the basic
1 54
right to self-organization and to bargain collectively,
it also held that this right was not affected in its integral
features by state laws regulating concerted action. 155
On the whole, then, the third approach to construction
of Section 7 is completely consistent with the second approach, and may in fact be regarded simply as an extension or refinement of that approach, whose value, if any,
lies in its more complete and satisfying explanation of the
central purpose of the section. Both approaches establish
a basic residium of rights which no state may deny to
unions and employees. Both establish an area of freedom
for state regulation beyond that point - so long, of course,
154 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782 (1945).
155 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154 (1942).
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as the state regulation does not conflict with any specific
provision of federal law.
One last pre-emptionist contention must be considered
before we may take it as completely established that the
framers of the Taft-Hartley Act did not intend to preclude
state action which goes beyond the scope of the Act. Section 14(b) states in effect that the states may go beyond
the Taft-Hartley Act in restricting the institution of compulsory unionism. If the position taken here reflects congressional intent, the pre-empfionists argue, Congress would
have felt no need for such a deliberate and express delegation of state authority. 156
158 A few other specific provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act may also be
noted in this connection. Thus it might also be argued that § 303 (b) of
the Act suggests congressional intent to pre-empt. That Section permits
damage actions "in any . . . court having jurisdiction of the parties" against
the unlawful strikes and boycotts defined in § 8 (b) (4) (A) of the NLRA,
as amended. Since this is in effect a grant of jurisdiction to state courts, the
pre-emptionists could as well contend here that the specific award of jurisiction shows that Congress assumed it had pre-empted the field of regulation
of these strikes and boycotts. Actually it "shows" no such thing. The specific
grant of jurisdiction shows only that Congress was intent upon eliminating
such strikes and boycotts from the industrial scene. In many states, the kinds
of strikes and boycotts defined in § 8 (b) (4) (A) are not unlawful. Naturally the courts in those states would accordingly afford no relief, except for the
power granted by § 303 (b). Section 301, giving the federal courts jurisdiction over violations of collective agreements might also conceivably be
advanced by the pre-emptionists, on the theory that it demonstrates complete congressional occupation of the "field." However, neither the text of
§ 301, the evil to be remedied, nor the legislative history of the section, SE.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947), bear out the contention.
Instead, they all indicate that Congress enacted § 301 mainly because not all
the states had made unions suable entities, and that it did not intend to preclude state-court jurisdiction over suits for violation of collective agreements.
Cf. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Bookbinders & Bindery Women's Local No. 49, 20 CCH LAB. CAS. f166, 484 (1951) (holding, after a
careful review of the statute and its legislative history, that the states continue to have jurisdiction to enforce collective agreements); Fay v. American
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also United
Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. (2d) 997 (7th
Cir. 1952); Textile Workers Union of America v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.
(2d) 529 (4th Cir. 1951); Masetta v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry
Co., . . . Ohio App. . . . , 107 N.E.(2d) 243 (1952); General Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. Local Unions, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.(2d) 250 (1952). Finally,
§ 14 (a) may have some bearing. That section recognizes, for purposes of
the NLRA, the bare legal right of supervisors to organize into unions, but
specifically declares that employers may not be compelled (presumably by
state law) to recognize or bargain with supervisors' unions. Prima facie, this
provision militates against the pre-emptionists in the same technical way that
many of their arguments support their position. That is, one might ask why
Congress felt it necessary to make express provision for preclusion of state
law if there was an implicit assumption of pre-emption. The pre-emptionist
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Like many of the pre-emptionist arguments, this one
has some superficial technical merit, but its only reaction
when jabbed is an expiring puff. Everyone knows that the
Eightieth Congress was particularly concerned with the
subject of compulsory unionism; that potent forces were at
work to outlaw the institution in all its forms; and that
very much alive at the time was the question whether the
Wagner Act had, by accepting all forms of compulsory
unionism, precluded the states from outlawing any form.
Thus the deliberate, express delegation of power to the
states may be entirely explained by the special circumstances surrounding the grant: Strongly opposed to all forms
of compulsory unionism but unwilling itself to reject the
institution completely, Congress virtually encouraged the
states to go all the way and at the same time precluded all
doubt of the validity of additional state sanctions. If the
doubts concerning the validity of further state action
were not alive - as they were not in connection with all
the other subjects presently under discussion -and if the
Congress were not so specifically aroused on the subject of
compulsory unionism, the probability is that Section 14(b)
would never have been written. As chance would have it, the
congressional doubts were unfounded; the Supreme Court
rebuttal is that express congressional pre-emption was necessary here because
supervisors were taken out of the "employee" category Jby § 2 (3) of the
NLRA, as amended, and therefore out of the "field" pre-empted by the Act.
Accordingly, the pre-emptionists conclude, if Congress wished completely to
free employers of the obligation to recognize and bargain with supervisors'
unions, an express provision such as § 14 (a) was necessary. The rebuttal
has some technical merit, as most pre-emptionist arguments do. But such
merit as exists once again vanishes when one notes the realities of the situation. Thus, what happens to the pre-emptionist position if a state should
make it unlawful for supervisors to organize unions and to engage in strikes?
The pre-emptionists would have to say, if their position is to have any meaning, that such state laws are precluded, because they go beyond the NLRA
generally and § 14 (a) particularly, which begins with the statement:
"Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from
becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization."
Obviously, this
provision restricts itself to the NLRA; it has no bearing, imposes no limitations, on state action which might go further than the NLRA. On the whole
it would appear that § 14 (a), like the rest of the statute, tends to suggest
that Congress was intent upon precluding, not state law generally, but only
such state law as enlarged trade-union immunities to legal process.
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ruled in Algoma,-5 7 a decision handed down after TaftHartley became law, that the Wagner Act did not in fact
preclude additional state regulation of compulsory unionism. While this decision cannot logically be advanced as a
demonstration in itself that Section 14(b) was superfluous
in the Taft-Hartley Act, or that pre-emptionists are plainly
wrong, it rather clearly weakens the argument that the
section operates somehow to preclude all state regulation
which .goes beyond any of the other features of the Act.
But perhaps the most forceful refutation of any preemptionist argument based on Section 14(b) is that the
section integrates with others in a manner distinguishable
in many ways from the situation obtaining in regard to
most subjects on which states may go beyond federal law.
Relevant here are the numerous and complex provisions
devoted to the subject of compulsory unionism in the TaftHartley Act: The Act concerned itself with the types of
compulsory-unionism agreements permissible, 58 the unions
which might bargain for them1 5 9 and the circumstances in
which action might be taken under them;1 60 authorization
and de-authorization elections were required,' s ' and unions
had to file reports and affidavits as prerequisites to participation "in those elections. 1 62 With this proliferation of
regulation- reminiscent of that adopted in connection.
with emergency strikes or strikes called to terminate or
modify collective agreements- the probability of conflict
between.state and federal law on the same general subject
matter was naturally heightened. In fact, the probability
did occur- there was conflict. 1 63 And of course in any
157 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691 (1949).
158 Section 8 (a) (3).
159 Majority unions only, under § 8 (a) (3).
160

Ibid.

161 Section 9 (e), which has since been amended by 65 Stat. 601 (1951),
29 U.S.C. § 159 (e) (Supp. 1952), to eliminate the original authorization
requirement.
162 Section 9 (f), (g) and (h).
163 Western Electric Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1949).
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case of conflict, state law would have to bow, unless Congress had expressly delegated authority to the states, as it
did in 14(b) . 164 These considerations seem on balance to
be the most compelling ones available. They are especially
persuasive in that they establish a real function for Section
14(b), a function, be it noted, which challenges any attempt to use the section as an indirect, negative item of
evidence of congressional intention to preclude all state
action which goes beyond the regulations specifically provided in the Act.
IV.
Conclusion
All substantial legal considerations having been covered,
we may now assert with some confidence that nothing in
the existing legal structure precludes state action which
goes beyond current national regulation of the concerted
activities of labor unions - always assuming, of course,
that the state action in question neither conflicts with a
specific provision of the national law nor infringes upon
the basic rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the NLRA.
This structure, we submit, should be maintained until the
national labor policy achieves and manifests in law far
more precision, comprehensiveness and maturity than it
now possesses. We insist, in fact, that the chances for
realization of a comprehensive and enduring labor policy
are increased by leaving with the states today the power
to go beyond national law in regulating details of labor
relations conduct.
This view gains strength when considered in the light
of the particular types of action which it would leave open
to the states. Generally speaking, state law may go beyond
national law, without conflicting with it, in two ways: The
states might regulate in a manner entirely consistent with
164 Notwithstanding the delegation of power to the states, the NLRB
held that the federal requirements were supreme. Western Electric Co., 84
N.L.R.B. 1019 (1949).

STATES' PARTICIPATION IN NAT'L LABOR POLICY 67

the basic policies of national law, though going beyond
the actual details of national law; and they might, in the
second place, establish regulations which, while not in
conflict with basic federal policy and law, are neutral in
regard to them. In either event, it is difficult to see how
the ultimate development of long-range national policy
could help being advanced.
As examples of the first type, consider state measures
which would unqualifiedly outlaw both all minority picketing for recognition and all secondary action in labor disputes. Minority picketing for recognition, as has already
been argued here, always coerces employee choice of representatives for collective-bargaining purposes, and always,
therefore, challenges the integrity of the current national
labor policy, which is orientated in terms of employee free
choice. 1 65 The fact that existing federal law does not in
terms always prohibit such picketing should certainly nof
stand in the way of state action reaching that result. For
by pursuing the logic of existing policy to that point, the
states provide occasion for clear-cut analysis of the ultimate
merits. Beyond any doubt, the New York Court of Appeals' forthright challenge last year 166 of the legality of
any minority picketing for recognition stimulated fruitful
discussion of the national labor policy as effectively as its
67
almost precisely contrary decisions did in years gone by.'
We should only lose, we should not gain, by forestalling
such decisions.
The same is true in all cases where state law pushes
existing national policy to new positions, beyond those
which happen to have been occupied in the federal law
165 See note 90 supra.
168 Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn,

(1951).

303 N.Y. 300,

101 N.E.(2d)
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167 E.g., Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63
(1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 606, 53 S.Ct. 397, 77 L.Ed. 981 (1933);
Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130
(1927); National Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters and Helpers v. Cumming,
170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902).
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of the moment. Thus, while existing national policy would
restrict the infiction of harm in labor disputes to the immediate parties, the essential elements of that policy have
been only partly covered in the written law. Taft-Hartley's
aim, according to its principal proponents, was to outlaw
all "secondary boycotts";168 yet, the Act failed to outlaw
the ultimate in such boycotts, according to current construction.1 69 The words of the Act make it unlawful for
a union by means of a secondary strike to cause businessmen to cease doing business with one another.170 But the
policy of narrowing the scope and effects of a labor dispute is equally frustrated when a union induces one businessman to cease doing business with another, not by an
immediate threat of strike, but on the basis of a contractual
arrangement whereby the employer involved agrees to deal
only with businessmen approved by the contracting union.
A "hot-cargo" or "struck goods" clause widens labor disputes as clearly as, and more effectively than, a threat of a
secondary strike; therefore it is at least equally in conflict
with the national policy. More than that, it is so clearly
in conflict that it might well have been held violative of
7
the Taft-Hartley Act, although not in terms prohibited,' '
except for the NLRB's penchant for restrictive interpretation whenever such interpretation serves to minimize the
impact of the Act upon unions. 72 In fact, since the "hotcargo" clause is always gained in collective bargaining, and
since the ultimate sanction in bargaining is the strike, a
secondary boycott procured by such a clause violates even
the terms of the Act, except on the speciously wooden in168 "It
has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and
bad secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never
succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of
secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice." Statement of Senator
Taft, 93 CoNo. REc. 4198 (1947).
169 Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.(2d) 906, 913 (2d Cir. 1952) (Learned
Hand, J., dissenting).
170 Section 8 (b) (4) (A), NLRA as amended.
171 And the independent NLRB General Counsel, Robert N. Denham,
so argued before the Board in the Rabovin case, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949).
172 Cf. notes 110-121 supra, and accompanying text.

STATES' PARTICIPATION IN NAT'L LABOR POLICY 69

terpretation which the NLRB has adopted.
The NLRB's refusal to pursue thoroughly the spirit and
policies of its legislation in such instances does not serve
to further the development of the existing national labor
policy. It serves only to confuse. Basic evaluation of policy
comes best when the issues are clearly drawn, and the issues can scarcely be tautly drawn when the stuff of which
they are made is dispersed in a dismal chaos. Once again,
then, we urge, state laws which explore the inner logic of
existing policy and apply it to new situations consistently
with its own premises can help considerably to shape the
better labor policy of the future, whatever we may choose
to make it.
The argument for allowing the states to probe beyond
the present national labor policy has much in common
with the one just advanced in favor of accepting state
action which delves within existing policy, pursuing its implications. In the light of the incompleteness and the felt
deficiencies of federal labor law today, state action which
is neutral in respect to existing policy - which develops
collaterally without conflicting with current policy - cannot sensibly be precluded. Our present national policy has
some elements of strength; effective protection of free employee choice of representatives, for example, seems to
have an appeal for Americans which promises it long life.
But every careful student of labor relations and of the
larger social, economic and political problems of which
labor relations are so significant and symbolic a part, must
feel that the problems with which national policy has not
yet really grappled exceed in both numbers and importance those on which policy has crystallized. In fact, the
most we can say for existing policy and law is that they
have made a sound start in recognizing that both unions
and employers may do things which clash with what seem
to be our most cherished social goals: individual freedom
and material abundance. The practical problem of fitting
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unions, their objectives and their methods of reaching objectives into the scheme of things is still largely before us.
This is not the place for an extensive analysis of the
deficiencies in existing national law, and we cannot hope
to predict the' new approaches, if any, which the states,
permitted the freedom to respond to the felt needs of
their members, might uncover. Yet, by mentioning briefly
some of the problems with which the national policy has
'll in some cases and only fragnot come to grips -at
may further point up the docmentarily in others -we
trinaire character of the pre-emptionist position and the
simple good sense inherent in the choice of leaving with
the states their traditional authority to adjust the conflicts
arising within their borders.
Much hard thinking remains to be done in regard to the.
internal affairs of unions. We have not even begun to
appreciate the relationships between the way in which
unions conduct their affairs internally and the external
social significance of unions.1 7 3 Meanwhile, union members
and officers who have been hurt in one way or another
by internal union operations - the number of cases being
handed down indicates that there are many- must have
some opportunity for relief, if the law is to serve its basic
function in society. The state courts provide at least a
forum and some measure of relief today. All other considerations aside, it would be deplorable to eliminate that
minimal relief simply because the Taft-Hartley Act has
made some random attempts at regulation of the operation of unions, as the pre-emptionists must urge if they
contend that state action is precluded in areas entered by
the national law. Moreover, the ultimate development of
policy in this phase of labor relations can only be advanced by leaving room for state action now.
173 I have elsewhere made an attempt to sketch the fundamental external
policy problems posed by the internal operations of unions. Petro, External
Significance of Internal Union Affairs in N.Y.U. FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 339 (1951).
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Similarly, the half-formulated and even less-executed
national policy against union action in restraint of trade
might well achieve more concreteness and coherence if the
state courts and legislatures were left free to ponder the
problem. There is still much to be said for the ancient
antipathy to group action which limits the free market,
and so many people are saying it that we should be foolish
to ignore its potentialities for the present subject. One of
the basic issues of our time, indeed, may be the extent to
which our encouragement of unionization requires the
inhibition of this old antipathy. Advancing wholeheartedly
the right of employees to organize, must we equally advance the right of employee organizations to take all concerted measures, short of overt violence and intimidation,
in pursuit of their economic interests? The common law,
the first effective resistance movement to conduct in restraint of trade, is showing us today how certain kinds of
union action restrain trade, to our general detriment, and
how such conduct may be prohibited without qualifying
our fundamental approval of the right of self-organization. 174
In a closely related way, the common law continues currently to build up doctrine bearing on the permissibility of
both the objectives of union action and the methods utilized by unions to gain their objectives - all on the basis
of classical tort theory which is entirely dissociated from
the approach of national labor law. 17 5 To be sure, the
174 See, for example, Best Motor Lines v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, . . . Tex. . . . , 237 S.W.(2d) 589 (1951), where the court felt that
a refusal to cross a picket line pursuant to a prior agreement amounted
purely and simply to conduct in restraint of trade. How such an agreement,
and such implementation, can be viewed as anything else is difficult for me
to appreciate. Some will say that workers ought to have more freedom of
combination than is allowed to others who combine to restrain trade in
furtherance of their own interests. But that is not the issue. Workers already
have that greater freedom, and nobody demurs. The real question is whether
or not unions are to have a completely unfettered privilege to engage in

combinations
in restraint of trade.
5
17 Cf. Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.(2d)

(1951); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.(2d)

(1941).
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national law does regulate union objectives to some degree
and the manner of union action to a somewhat greater
degree. The vital point here, however, is that the statutory method lacks the fertility of the common-law dialectic.
Thus the common law has repeatedly asked over the years
in particular cases whether the deliberate infliction of harm
by a union pursuing a given objective or using a particular
technique is justified by the acknowledged rights of employees; it has asked and continues to ask in multitudes of
specific cases whether acceptance of the basic functions of
unions requires the privileging of the union conduct in
issue, whether it be a slowdown, a boycott resisting technological change, or a strike attempting to restrain a businessman from operating -twenty-four hours daily when solid
business considerations commend such operation. Out of
this eternal questioning, argument and deliberation, in the
context of varying social conditions and other forces, a considerable quantity of practical wisdom has accrued, much
of it embodied in current statutory law, state and federal.
Now we are coming as a nation face-to-face with some
of the most profoundly important consequences of the
policies favoring unionism. How far are unions to be allowed to go in sharing effective control over the specific
details of production? What is to be done about the power
of unions to shut down production to a degree which immediately impinges on the consciousness and needs of the
general public? We may be forced soon to move to new
policy positions. On some matters, we agree, both law
and policy preclude state participation in the process of
development, but this seems scarcely the time to make
labor relations and law as a whole the intramural sport
exclusively of the National Labor Relations Board, or even
Sylvester Petro*
of the National Congress.
* Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. A.B.,
1942, J.D., 1945, University of Chicago; LL.M., 1950, University of Michigan.
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